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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS 
 
#Ni Una Menos: 
Policy Approaches to Gender-Based Violence 
in Central America 
 
by 
 
Luiza Kinzerska-Martinez 
Master of Arts in Latin American Studies 
University of California, Los Angeles, 2020 
Professor Teresa Cecilia Menjivar, Chair 
 
The legacies of twentieth-century state violence in Central America continue to prosper in 
the region’s political, cultural, economic, and social life. Today, high levels of gender-based 
violence and feminicide in Central American countries, especially in Guatemala, El Salvador, and 
Honduras, can be traced, in part, to the historic effects of state violence. As a result, in recent 
decades, these countries have passed national laws to prevent, sanction, and eradicate gender-based 
violence. Despite legislative initiatives taken by governments, high levels of impunity in the 
legislative and judicial systems, hierarchical structures of gender, class, and race, heteropatriarchal 
national values, and corruption have obstructed progress toward a society where women can lead 
lives free of violence. Using the violence triangle and multisided violence theoretical frameworks, 
this work explores the multifaceted nature of violence in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, 
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focusing on structural, cultural/symbolic, direct, state, everyday, political, gender/gendered, and 
legal violence. Drawing from eight in-depth, semi-structured interviews and public discourse 
analysis, this study ultimately investigates how these different forms of violence coalesce and 
affect the implementation and enforcement of laws on gender-based violence that are on the books 
in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 In the early morning hours of August 13, 2005, police found the lifeless body of Claudina 
Isabel Velásquez Paiz, a 19-year-old law student, on the street in Zone 11 of Guatemala City. The 
night of her death, between midnight and two in the morning, Velásquez Paiz had been walking 
home from a party and speaking on the phone with her boyfriend’s mother, Zully Moreno. When 
their phone call was suddenly cut short by Velásquez Paiz’s cries for help, Moreno rushed to 
Claudina’s home to inform her family. After Claudina’s parents searched for their daughter in 
every neighborhood en route from the party to their home, they tried to file a missing person report 
at about three in the morning. In response, police officers claimed they could not file one until she 
had been missing for at least twenty-four hours. Just a few hours later, police found Claudina’s 
bruised body with a gunshot wound to the head. The first officers on the scene classified Velásquez 
Paiz as a gang member or sex worker because she wore a navel piercing and sandals. (Sanford, 
2008, p. 114) In the eyes of the police, this made the case unworthy of further investigation.  
Guatemala has notoriously low crime investigation and prosecution rates: in 2005, only 8 
out of 5,338 homicides were successfully prosecuted. (Sanford, 2008, p. 117) Claudina’s parents, 
however, adamantly sought justice for their daughter’s death. Because of their insistence, 
Velásquez Paiz’s murder made national headlines as one of the few cases of feminicide under 
investigation. The case, however, was marked by several fatal flaws, including the police’s failure 
to promptly open an investigation, preserve and collect evidence from the crime scene, perform 
adequate forensic tests and analyses, and interview witnesses. (WOLA, 2006) Prosecutors and 
investigators assigned to the case were also frequently rotated, and joint meetings were never 
arranged to discuss continuity strategies. (Sanford, 2008, p. 117) As the fifteenth anniversary of 
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her death approaches, Claudina’s case remains unsolved in the Guatemalan courts and her 
perpetrator(s) have yet to be identified. 
Claudina’s story is not an anomaly in Guatemala; hundreds of women and their families 
face similar fates every year. In fact, throughout Central America, women have been 
systematically murdered at increasingly alarming rates in the past three decades. Between 1995 
and 2004, homicides of men increased by 68%, while those of women grew by 144%. (Carcedo, 
2010, p. 40–42) From 2002 to 2008, more than 2,700 women were raped, mutilated, and murdered 
in Guatemala; of all these cases, only sixteen made it to trial. (Velasco, 2008, p. 398) Women in 
neighboring El Salvador and Honduras also face some of the highest rates of female homicide in 
the world. From 2002 to August 2018, 6,111 female homicides were recorded in Honduras (Foro 
de Mujeres por la Vida, 2018), while in El Salvador there were 7,076 registered cases. (ORMUSA, 
2019) To situate these figures within a global context, from 2007 to 2012, El Salvador, Honduras, 
and Guatemala ranked first, second, and fourth, respectively, in highest female homicide rates in 
the world. El Salvador registered 14.4 homicides per 100,000 women, Honduras 10.9, and 
Guatemala 9.8. (Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, 2015, p. 94) 
Research Question 
In response to growing threats of violence against women in Guatemala, El Salvador, and 
Honduras, feminist and human rights groups in these countries have pushed for national legislation 
to prevent, sanction, and eradicate discrimination and violence against women. Out of an interest 
to learn more about these policies, I initially posed the following research question: How are 
government policies in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras attempting to alleviate rampant 
gender-based violence in the twenty-first century? To what extent have these attempts been 
successful? Following a survey of the literature, I found that most policy analysts have already 
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deemed these laws “unsuccessful” and was instead drawn to the way in which scholars (Hume, 
2008; Carey and Torres, 2010; Musalo and Bookey, 2014; Walsh and Menjívar, 2016a, 2016b; 
Menjívar and Walsh, 2017) discuss structural, symbolic, and political barriers to policy 
implementation in these countries. My research further led me in this direction, as these themes 
also emerged in the data I collected. As I drew all of these observations into my study, my final 
research question cohered around these ideas: Numerous laws on gender-based discrimination and 
violence are on the books in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, such as the Law Against 
Femicide and Other Forms of Violence Against Women (2008), Special Comprehensive Law for 
a Life Free of Violence for Women (2011), and Law of Equal Opportunities for Women (2000), 
respectively. Despite these laws, rates of gender-based violence—particularly female homicides, 
sexual violence, and intrafamily violence—remain exceptionally high in all three countries. (See 
Appendices, Tables 1-4) Therefore, it seems laws are necessary, but not sufficient, to combat 
gender-based violence. What factors may be affecting the proper implementation and enforcement 
of these laws in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras?1 
This work begins with an overview of national laws that address violence against women 
in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. I then define terms such as “gender-based violence” 
and “violence against women,” and briefly dive into important historical background from each of 
the countries. I follow this with a survey of the academic literature on gender-based violence and 
then discuss the methodological tools that undergird this research: public discourse analysis and 
in-depth, semi-structured interviews with representatives from women’s and human rights 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1! I refrain from using the term “Northern Triangle” to refer to Guatemala, El Salvador, and 
Honduras in this work due to its ties with neoliberal trade treaties and its derogatory use in 
international discourse, through which the term has become virtually synonymous with violence. 
(Chavez and Avalos, 2014; Schmidt and Buechler, 2017, p. 155)!
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organizations. Afterwards, I analyze the themes that emerged in the data I collected, such as the 
normalization of crimes against women, the patriarchal family, religion, and political violence. I 
then borrow components of Galtung’s violence triangle (direct, cultural, and structural violence), 
and Menjívar’s multisided violence (structural, symbolic, everyday, political, gender/gendered, 
and legal violence) frameworks to unearth how these forms of violence affect policy 
implementation and enforcement in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. 
International Human Rights Conventions 
Out of concern for rising threats of violence against women globally, feminist and human 
rights groups have pushed for international standards to prevent, sanction, and eliminate 
discrimination and violence against women. Consequently, in 1979, the United Nations established 
the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and in 1994, the 
Organization of American States (OAS) adopted the Inter-American Convention on the 
Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence Against Women, more commonly known as 
the Convention of Belém do Pará. On the one hand, CEDAW pushed to end global discrimination 
against women in political and public life, representation, education, employment, health, 
economic and social life, law, and marriage and family life, among other areas. The 1979 
Convention defines “discrimination against women” as:  
any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or 
purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment, and exercise of women, 
irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any 
other field. (UN Women, 2019) 
 
On the other hand, the Convention of Belém do Pará recognizes violence against women as an 
international human rights violation, and defines it as “any act of conduct, based on gender, which 
causes death or physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, whether in the 
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public or the private sphere.” (OAS, 2019) Article 2 of the Convention details the circumstances 
in which these physical, sexual or psychological forms of violence are deemed violations of 
women’s human rights, such as when they take place “within the family or domestic unit,” “in the 
community and . . . [when they are] perpetrated by any person, including, among others, rape, 
sexual abuse, torture, trafficking in persons, forced prostitution, kidnapping and sexual harassment 
in the workplace, as well as in educational institutions, health facilities or any other place,” and 
“[those which are] perpetrated or condoned by the state or its agents.” (OAS, 2019)  
National Policy Responses 
Guatemala 
Feminist groups and activists in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras have used these 
international standards to push their states to combat and criminalize gender-based discrimination 
and violence through national law. In Guatemala, these laws include: Law to Prevent, Sanction 
and Eradicate Intrafamily Violence (Decree No. 97-96), passed in 1996, Law for the Dignification 
and Integral Promotion of Women (Decree No. 7-99) from 1999, Law Against Femicide and Other 
Forms of Violence Against Women (Decree No. 22-2008), passed in 2008, and Law Against 
Sexual Violence, Exploitation, and Trafficking of Persons (Decree 9-2009) from 2009.  
The Law to Prevent, Sanction and Eradicate Intrafamily Violence (1996) defines 
intrafamily violence as “any action or omission that directly or indirectly causes physical, sexual, 
psychological or patrimonial harm or suffering, both in the public and private [sphere], to a person 
who is a member of the family group, on behalf of relatives, cohabiters or former cohabiters, 
spouse or former spouse, or with whom they have sons or daughters.” (República de Guatemala, 
1996) The law calls for state institutions to maintain a registry of reports and declares that 
magistrate’s courts on duty must deal with matters related to the application of this law. Though it 
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demands national police protect victims and detain resistant aggressors, this legislation does not 
outwardly criminalize acts of intrafamily violence, as no prison sentences or fines are established. 
The Law for the Dignification and Integral Promotion of Women (1999) defines 
discrimination against women as “any distinction, exclusion or restriction based on sex, ethnicity, 
age and religion . . . [that] impairs or nullifies recognition, enjoyment, or exercise of social and 
individual rights set forth in the Political Constitution of the Republic.” (República de Guatemala, 
1999) Violence against women is laid out as any act or action that, due to conditions of gender, 
inflicts physical, moral, or psychological harm on a woman.2 The law calls for State protection of 
the family, equal access to vocational education and training, childcare services for working 
mothers, pre- and post-natal care services, and judicial equality, to combat social, economic, 
political, and cultural discrimination and violence against women. 
 The Law Against Femicide and Other Forms of Violence Against Women (2008) defines 
femicide as the “violent death of a woman, in the context of unequal power relations between men 
and women, caused by using the power of gender against women.” (República de Guatemala, 
2008) This legislation outlaws physical, psychological, sexual, and economic violence against 
women, which it defines as follows: physical violence causes physical harm or suffering to a 
woman, psychological violence includes controlling behavior or intimidation, sexual violence 
violates women’s sexual freedom, and economic violence affects women’s access to material 
goods that belong to them by right or that cause damage or loss of objects/material property. Under 
this law, femicide is punishable by 25 to 50 years in prison, crimes of physical and/or sexual 
violence are penalized with 5 to 12 years, and psychological and/or economic violence with 5 to 8 
years. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2  The law does not spell out what constitutes “moral harm.” 
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The Law Against Sexual Violence, Exploitation, and Trafficking of Persons (2009) 
condemns physical, psychological, and/or sexual violence and establishes the following principles: 
confidentiality of information collected from victimized persons, individual and differentiated 
protection, no re-victimization in legal processes, no discrimination, respect for cultural identity, 
and effective restitution of the victims’ exercise of rights. (República de Guatemala, 2009) This 
law is not unprecedented, as it adapts certain articles from the country’s Penal Code. Article 28 of 
the law, for instance, draws from Article 173 (on rape) of the Penal Code.3 Sexual exploitation 
(defined as the promotion of prostitution) of minors and persons of legal age is penalized with a 
minimum of 5 years’ prison time, while human trafficking is punishable by 8 to 18 years in prison 
and a fine of 300,000 to 500,000 Quetzales (≈$40,000 to $65,000 USD). 
El Salvador 
In El Salvador, policies that address violence against women include: Law Against 
Intrafamily Violence (Decree No. 902), passed in 1996, Law of Equality, Equity and Eradication 
of Discrimination Against Women (Decree No. 645), signed into law in 2011, and Special 
Comprehensive Law for a Life Free of Violence for Women (Decree No. 520), also from 2011. 
The Law Against Intrafamily Violence (1996) defines intrafamily violence as “any act or omission, 
direct or indirect, that causes harm, physical, sexual, or psychological suffering, or death to 
members of a family.” (República de El Salvador, 1996) This legislation breaks down intrafamily 
violence into four types: psychological (direct or indirect actions that control or degrade someone’s 
actions, behavior, beliefs, or decisions), physical (actions or behaviors that threaten or injure 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3!Article 173 of the Penal Code states that, “Anyone who, with physical or psychological violence, 
gains carnal access vaginally, anally or orally to another person, or inserts any part of their body 
or objects, by any of the indicated routes, or forces another person to insert it themselves, will be 
sanctioned with a prison sentence of eight to twelve years.” (República de Guatemala, 1973)!
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someone’s physical integrity), sexual (actions that force someone to participate in physical or 
verbal sexual contact), and patrimonial (actions that prevent the adequate care of family needs or 
damage, lose, or destruct financial assets). Though the law requires police officers to seek medical 
attention for victims, preserve evidence, and detain aggressors, it does not establish prison 
sentences for perpetrators.  
The Special Comprehensive Law for a Life Free of Violence for Women (2011) 
criminalizes seven types of violence: economic (actions that limit, control, or prevent women’s 
economic survival), feminicidal (violent deaths of women that result from misogynistic behaviors 
and lead to state impunity), physical (acts that cause physical harm and/or suffering), 
psychological/emotional (acts that cause emotional harm), patrimonial (actions that destroy, harm, 
or retain objects, personal documents, and valuables), sexual (acts that threaten or violate women’s 
right to voluntarily choose sexual encounters), and symbolic (messages, values, icons, or signs that 
reproduce relations of domination, inequality, or discrimination in social relations). Under this 
law, feminicide is punishable by 20 to 50 years in prison, economic violence by 1 to 6 years, 
patrimonial violence by 2 to 4 years, and sexual violence by 3 to 10 years. 
 The Law of Equality, Equity and Eradication of Discrimination Against Women (2011) 
aims to eliminate all forms of discrimination that directly and indirectly prevent Salvadoran 
women from fully exercising their citizenship rights in the social, economic, political, and cultural 
spheres of life. Several principles undergird this law, such as: equality (defined as an individual 
and collective right in terms of equal opportunity and treatment), equity (actions that lead to 
equality), and non-discrimination (prohibition of de jure and de facto discrimination against 
women). This legislation calls for state institutions to eliminate discriminatory social behaviors 
and functions, eradicate obstacles to women’s performance and intervention in all areas of 
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collective and individual work, and reform laws, regulations, or resolutions that limit or deny 
principles of equality and non-discrimination. (República de El Salvador, 2011b) 
Honduras 
In Honduras, policies that address violence against women in response to international 
conventions include: Law Against Domestic Violence (Decree No. 132-97), signed into law in 
1997, Law of Equal Opportunities for Women (Decree No. 34-2000), passed in 2000, and Article 
118-A (on Femicide) in the Honduran Penal Code (Decree No. 22-2013), added in 2013. The Law 
Against Domestic Violence (1997) defines domestic violence as “any pattern of conduct associated 
with a situation of unequal exercise of power that manifests itself in the use of physical, 
psychological, patrimonial and/or economic, and sexual violence.” (República de Honduras, 1997) 
This legislation recognizes four different types of domestic violence: physical (actions that harm 
or undermine the corporeal integrity of women), psychological (actions that degrade or control the 
actions, behaviors, beliefs, or decisions of women), sexual (threatening or intimidating acts that 
affect the sexual integrity and self-determination of women), and patrimonial/economic (acts that 
lead to loss, negation, destruction, or retention of objects, personal documents, valuables, or 
economic rights and resources). Though the law does not establish prison sentences, aggressors 
may be sanctioned with 1 to 3 months of community service. 
The Law of Equal Opportunities for Women (2000) defines discrimination against women 
as “any distinction, exclusion, or restriction based on sex, that . . . impair[s] or nullif[ies] the 
recognition, enjoyment, or exercise . . . of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, 
economic, social, cultural and civil spheres.” (República de Honduras, 2000) This law calls on the 
state to design and apply public policies that promote gender equality, ensure equitable opportunity 
in the legal system, prevent, combat, and eradicate domestic and intrafamily violence, take 
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measures to prevent teenage pregnancies, provide appropriate and accessible technology that 
responds to the needs of women in urban and rural areas, and revise educational legislation to 
eliminate the division of labor by sex, among others. Those who violate any section of this law 
may be fined 5,000 lempiras (≈$200 USD). 
The unprecedented Article 118-A on Femicide (Decree No. 23-2013) in the Honduran 
Penal Code defines femicide as a crime “committed by a man, or men, who kill(s) a woman for 
reasons related to gender, with hatred and contempt for her condition as a woman.” (República de 
Honduras, 1983) This provision penalizes crimes of femicide with a 30 to 40 year prison sentence 
in the following circumstances: when the aggressor has a relationship with the victim, whether 
marital, free union or any other related relationship, when the crime is preceded by acts of domestic 
violence within the family or a situation of sexual violence, harassment, or persecution of any 
nature, or when the crime is committed with cruelty or when degrading/mutilating lesions are 
inflicted on the victim before or after their death. 
Efficacy of National Policies 
Despite the fact that national legislation in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras has 
adapted international human rights protocols, quantitative data shows that all three countries 
continue to reflect exceptionally high rates of female homicides, intrafamily violence, and sexual 
violence.4 In Guatemala, for instance, Article 17 of the Law Against Femicide and other Forms of 
Violence Against Women (2008) pledges state resources to the National Coordinator for the 
Prevention of Domestic Violence and Violence Against Women (CONAPREVI). However, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4!Though statistics help quantify the impact of violence against women in Guatemala, El Salvador, 
and Honduras, their accuracy comes into question because many crimes go unreported due to 
structural factors, fear of a perpetrator’s retaliation, lack of faith in the justice system, as well as 
the normalization of violence in the everyday lives of people.!
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reported cases of intrafamily violence steadily increased in the first five years after the law passed 
in 2008. (see Appendices, Table 1) And though these rates have decreased since 2013, as of 2018, 
they remained far higher than they were in 2008. After the addition of Article 118-A on femicide 
to the Honduran Penal Code in 2013, female homicide rates in Honduras only slightly decreased, 
going from 478 reported cases in 2015 to 383 in 2018. (see Appendices, Table 2) Reports of sexual 
violence against women in Honduras, however, remain high, running upwards of 2,000 cases a 
year since 2010. (see Appendices, Table 3) In El Salvador, after the Special Comprehensive Law 
for a Life Free of Violence for Women (2011) passed, rates of intrafamily violence shot up in 2013 
and then decreased in 2015. (see Appendices, Table 4)  
While the governments of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras have drawn up these 
national laws, they fail to allocate sufficient funds to ensure their proper implementation (Prieto-
Carrón, Thomson, and Macdonald, 2007). Additionally, law enforcement is affected by police 
officers who do not take this legislation seriously. In El Salvador, for instance, a female police 
agent observes that her male counterparts often claim there are no available personnel or vehicles 
when her precinct receives a domestic violence call. (de los Reyes, 2013) In another tragic 
example, 22-year-old Graciela Eugenia Ramírez Chávez died after her fiancé stabbed her 56 times 
in February 2018. According to Douglas Meléndez, former attorney general of El Salvador, “on 
repeated occasions neighbours called the [emergency number] to report the victim was being 
attacked but the police never turned up.” (Griffin, 2018) Similarly, Menjívar and Bejarano (2004) 
note these patterns in the testimony of a Salvadoran immigrant woman: “The police? Who would 
think of calling the police back there [in El Salvador]? If you called them (in case of domestic 
violence) they’ll think it’s a prank and they won’t even bother coming!” (p. 133)!
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Defining Gender-Based Violence and Violence Against Women 
Conceptualizations of violence constantly adapt and change depending on context, place, 
and space. Due to a diversity of beliefs and practices when it comes to violence, I operationalize 
the Convention of Belém do Pará’s definition of violence against women in this study: “any act of 
conduct, based on gender, which causes death or physical, sexual or psychological harm or 
suffering to women, whether in the public or the private sphere.” I use the terms “gender-based 
violence” and “violence against women” interchangeably to broadly refer to intrafamily violence 
(i.e. intimate partner violence, domestic violence), sexual violence, femicide/feminicide, and 
gender discrimination.5 These forms of violence can, and often do, overlap. 
One of the ongoing theoretical debates regarding violence against women has centered on 
the terms femicide and feminicide. Feminist writers Jill Radford and Diana Russell originally 
defined the term femicide as “the murder of women and girls because they are female.” (1992; 
Russell and Harmes, 2001) Mexican feminist activist Marcela Lagarde adopted the term 
feminicide to emphasize that these killings are not only gender-motivated, but are also products of 
impunity and institutional violence on behalf of law enforcement, forensic, legislative, and judicial 
systems. (Toledo Vásquez, 2009; Lagarde, 2006, 2008; Walsh and Menjívar, 2016a, 2016b) 
According to Fregoso and Bejarano (2010), feminicide is a “systemic [form of] violence rooted in 
social, political, economic, and cultural inequalities” and is “both public and private, implicating 
both the state (directly or indirectly) and individual perpetrators (private or state actors).” (p. 5) 
Because this work looks at different social, political, and structural factors that affect policy 
implementation and enforcement, I operationalize Lagarde’s term feminicide. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 See Discussion section for conceptual definitions of the terms “gender violence” and “gendered 
violence.” 
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Research Objectives and Goals 
This study has several objectives: 1) understand the role that political discourse plays in 
shaping narratives on crimes against women, 2) identify factors that may impact the 
implementation of policies that combat feminicide, sexual violence, intrafamily violence, and all 
other gender-based forms of violence, 3) understand how these factors may contribute to cycles of 
gender-based violence, and 4) unpack how violence, especially violence against women, is 
understood in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras.  
To better comprehend how violence is understood and shaped in these countries, I 
foreground my research with some historical context—more specifically, recent histories of civil 
conflict and United States intervention in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. These histories 
help contextualize and illustrate how state violence and terror have translated almost directly into 
violence against women today. Sanford (2008) notes that some of these connections include the 
torture and sexual violence practiced against political dissenters during civil conflicts, and the 
mutilation and rape that often accompanies the murder of women in the present day. As I argue 
later on in this work, these histories also lay a groundwork for understanding the normalized use 
of violence in everyday life during times of conflict, which has contributed, in part, to the 
naturalization and minimization of crimes against women in the present. However, since this study 
does not focus specifically on histories of civil conflict and U.S. intervention in Central America, 
I only go into this background briefly and broadly.6 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 It is important to acknowledge, as Carey and Torres (2010) highlight, that identifying histories 
of U.S. intervention and civil conflict “as the sole or even primary [catalysts of contemporary 
cycles of violence in Central America] ignores a greater historical trend of widespread violence 
against women and disregard for their civil rights that dates back at least to the dictatorships of the 
early twentieth century.” (p. 144–145) However, these distant histories are beyond the scope of 
this work. See Carey and Torres (2010) for more on these “precursors to femicide.” 
! 14 
Historical Context 
Guatemala 
In Guatemala, United States intervention in the twentieth century began with the United 
Fruit Company (UFCO), a U.S.-owned and operated corporation that produced and marketed 
tropical fruits, mainly bananas, grown in Latin America. The UFCO first moved into Guatemala 
in 1901, and over the next twenty years, gained a strong hold over land, transportation, and regional 
trade. As the influence of the UFCO grew, the Guatemalan government’s power became severely 
limited. Consequently, in 1921, Carlos Herrera, the Guatemalan president at the time, pushed for 
agrarian reform that threatened the status of UFCO contracts. Consequently, military forces ousted 
him less than a year after he took office.  
The UFCO would once again face opposition from the Guatemalan government thirty years 
later, when democratically elected President Jacobo Árbenz came to power in 1951. Árbenz 
ardently supported agrarian reform and opposed economic dependency. His government passed 
the Law of Agrarian Reform (1952), which promoted the distribution of idle and public land to the 
landless at a fraction of its market cost. (Stewart, 2009, p. 404) As a result, the U.S. labelled the 
Árbenz government a communist threat and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) staged an 
overthrow. The U.S. government installed a series of leaders after Árbenz, which inspired a wave 
of armed resistance. Guerilla forces waged a war against the state in 1960, and in response, U.S. 
military advisors trained the Guatemalan army in brutal “counterinsurgency” techniques to quell 
dissenters: death squads, air bombs, and scorched earth policy. (Stewart, 2009, p. 406–407)  
The civil conflict reached genocidal proportions under the leadership of General Efraín 
Ríos Montt from 1982 to 1983. (Sanford, 2003) Ríos Montt pledged he would eliminate guerilla 
forces as he ordered soldiers to sweep through the mountains of the Guatemalan highlands and 
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wipe out entire villages of Indigenous Maya deemed to have colluded with the “enemy.” Following 
Ríos Montt’s political reign, the internal armed conflict carried on through death squads that 
operated on behalf of the military in the highlands and in the capital. (Stewart, 2009, p. 410) 
According to the Center for Justice and Accountability, over 200,000 people were killed or forcibly 
disappeared throughout this civil conflict, and a United Nations-sponsored Historical Clarification 
Commission identified that 83% of the victims were Indigenous Maya. U.S.-funded government 
forces committed 93% of the human rights violations that occurred during this time. (CJA, 2018) 
The civil conflict between the Guatemalan government and leftist rebel groups lasted thirty-six 
years (1960–1996), and is now infamously known as La Violencia. 
El Salvador 
In El Salvador, the historical roots of an internal armed conflict can be traced back to 
agrarian reform in the late nineteenth century. In 1881, the Salvadoran state dispossessed the land 
of campesinos (farm peasants) when it abolished communal forms of property ownership to make 
way for private coffee production estates. The reform contributed to the rise of a small oligarchy 
that possessed most of the country’s wealth and political power. These land reforms brought about 
numerous farmer-led uprisings from the late 1800s until 1932. Oligarchic elites, in turn, sponsored 
security forces to violently repress popular resistance. (Wolf, 2017, p. 1) From January to July 
1932, the Salvadoran army suppressed these rebellions and killed approximately 30,000 people 
(most of them Indigenous) in a massacre now known as La Matanza. 
Agrarian reform and La Matanza paved the way for contemporary political-power 
structures in El Salvador, as the state, North (1982) claims, began to rely “increasingly on coercion 
to guarantee the stability and expansion of the new economic order.” (p. 62) In response to 
repressive structural conditions from a century of elite control, and the assassination of Archbishop 
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Óscar Arnulfo Romero,7 guerrilla forces launched an armed struggle in 1980; these forces 
identified collectively as the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN).8 Oligarchic 
elites, however, were determined to secure their socioeconomic privileges. In turn, they founded 
their own party, the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA), and funded extrajudicial death 
squads to suppress the opposition. (Wolf, 2017) Over the course of the civil conflict, the United 
States government trained many Salvadoran soldiers on U.S. soil and channeled nearly $6 billion 
in aid to ensure a victory against socialist and communist ideologies. (Howard, 2008) 
Consequently, the FMLN fought against U.S.-backed Salvadoran military forces for a span of 
twelve years (1980–1992), during which approximately 80,000 people were killed. 
Honduras 
Though Honduras has not directly experienced an internal armed conflict as Guatemala 
and El Salvador have, U.S. intervention, as well as state violence and terror, have permeated the 
Honduran social fabric and political economy in other ways. For one thing, the Honduran 
government received financial and military assistance from the Reagan administration to train, 
support, and provide shelter for the contras, U.S.-backed right-wing rebel groups designed to bring 
down the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. According to a publication from The New York 
Times (1986), “American troops [were] regularly stationed in Honduras and [took] part in joint 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Óscar Arnulfo Romero, Archbishop of San Salvador, is a martyr for Catholics. His sermons 
linked “religious power with revolution,” as he advocated for peace, democracy, and national 
reconciliation. (Landau, 1993, p. 87) In March 1980, Salvadoran military personnel killed Romero 
while he was giving Mass. This was early on in the civil conflict between the government and 
guerilla forces. (Peterson and Peterson, 2008, p. 511–512) 
 
8 Farabundo Martí was a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary leader who led the 1932 agrarian uprising 
in El Salvador. Members of the Salvadoran military assassinated him in February 1932, shortly 
after the rebellion began. 
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exercises with Honduran troops. Military instructors under contract to the Central Intelligence 
Agency ha[d] trained contras in the past at isolated camps in Honduras.”  
U.S. intervention and state violence intersected once again in Honduras following a coup 
d’état in 2009, in which military forces overthrew democratically elected President Manuel Zelaya. 
Prior to his overthrow, Zelaya had pushed for economic reforms to increase minimum wage, 
reduce public debt, build new schools, and subsidize public transportation. He also made a call to 
rewrite the 1982 Honduran constitution, originally written under the regime of Policarpo Paz 
García, a U.S.-backed military autocrat. (Zunes, 2016) National courts ruled Zelaya’s actions 
illegal and unconstitutional, despite the fact that they were legal under the 2006 Honduran Civil 
Participation Act (FERH, 2009, p. 6–7; Gervais and Estévez, 2011, p. 2) After the coup, the state 
remained heavily militarized; police and military personnel arrested, beat, tortured, or killed 
anyone who publicly expressed opposition to the new government.  
Though the public democratically elected Zelaya, the U.S. government stood by the notion 
that the coup constituted a crucial step in Honduras’ path to democracy. The OAS and UN General 
Assembly called for the “immediate and unconditional return” of Zelaya, but the U.S. evaded 
openly taking a side. In turn, the United States sponsored new elections that were “marred by 
violence and media censorship,” in which Porfirio Lobo was elected the new president. (Zunes, 
2016) The U.S. Department of State also continued to channel aid to Honduras under the 
justification that it was unclear if the military overthrow constituted a coup d’état. (Zunes, 2016) 
Menjívar and Walsh (2017) argue that post-coup state violence now “concentrates on ‘common’ 
criminals, often gangs . . . [and that] repressive tactics used against the opposition in the past are 
now used to combat gangs and criminal groups.” (p. 224)  
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State Violence and Legacies on Gender-Based Violence 
Though a decade has passed since the Honduran coup d’état, and over two decades since 
the end of the Salvadoran and Guatemalan internal armed conflicts, legacies of state violence 
continue to thrive in the political, economic, and social fabric of these countries. United States 
imperialism has arguably been a leading contributor to the persistence of state violence in Central 
America, especially considering that military intervention increased capacities for violence, 
extended the duration of conflict, and obstructed mitigation and peace processes (Rosser, 1995, p. 
180). Historically, U.S. intervention in these countries has installed autocrats into positions of 
political power, interfered with democratic elections, and aggravated social, economic, and state 
power imbalances.  
Scholars such as Sanford (2008) and Carey and Torres (2010) have been at the forefront 
on discussions of state violence and its legacies on contemporary cycles of violence against women 
in Guatemala. Sanford, for instance, identifies connections between historical contexts of state 
terror and impunity for perpetrators of war crimes and contemporary social cleansing campaigns 
led by the state in Guatemala. (2008, p. 106). She defines social cleansing as “a mechanism of 
selective or arbitrary repression that is systematically produced by either armed actors with ties to 
the state or by private actors who carry out repression with the acquiescence, complicity, support, 
or toleration (whether deliberate or involuntary) of the state.” (Sanford, 2008, p. 110) During the 
internal armed conflict, mass-scale sexual violence and torture became common tools of repression 
at the hands of the state. Today, Sanford argues, patterns of social cleansing can be seen in the 
signs of torture that mark the bodies of victims of feminicide: strangulation, beatings, bound hands 
and feet, and sexual abuse, among others.  
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Carey and Torres (2010) also argue that the Guatemalan internal armed conflict embedded 
systemic impunity into the country’s legal and social fabric, which “post-war” peace processes 
that absolved most perpetrators of war crimes further cemented. (Carey and Torres, 2010, p. 144; 
CEH, 1999; Consorcio Actores de Cambio, 2006) Though Guatemala and El Salvador are 
classified as “post-war” societies, and Honduras as “post-coup,” political sociologist Julia Zulver 
notes how the prospect of “thousands of former combatants return[ing] home without . . .  
employment, and thousands of weapons . . . circulat[ing] in civilian hands” places into perspective 
widespread and growing violence in the region. (2016, p. 173) Later on in this work, I will discuss 
how everyday routines of torture, sexual violence, and murder at the hands of the state during the 
Guatemalan and Salvadoran internal armed conflicts, and following the Honduran coup d’état, 
helped normalize and naturalize the use of violence in each of these countries. (Scheper-Hughes 
1992, 1996; Bourgois, 2001; Menjívar, 2008, 2011; Walsh and Menjívar, 2016a) As I show next, 
my survey of the literature indicates that scholars have drawn from these historical contexts to 
understand how cultural and symbolic violence, political and legal violence, and structural and 
economic violence have contributed to and/or exacerbated gender-based violence in contemporary 
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
In my review of the literature, I surveyed secondary academic sources that explore causes 
of gender-based violence and assess public policies that target these forms of violence in 
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. I group these academic works based on pillars in Galtung’s 
(1969, 1990) violence triangle and Menjívar’s (2008, 2011) multisided violence frameworks. 
Broadly speaking, both frames adapt a multifaceted approach to violence: Galtung’s violence 
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triangle explains violence in terms of direct, structural, and cultural forces, while Menjívar’s 
multisided violence looks at this phenomenon through several lenses: structural, symbolic, 
everyday, political, gender/gendered, and legal violence.9 Because most of the literature I survey 
integrates multiple components of these two frameworks, the groupings I set up in this review 
consist of pairs: cultural and symbolic violence, political and legal violence, and structural and 
economic violence. Economic violence is not an explicit component of these frames; however, it 
appears prominently in the literature and is, arguably, encompassed in the structural violence pillar 
of Galtung’s (1969, 1990) and Menjívar’s (2008, 2011) frameworks. 
Cultural and Symbolic Violence 
The readings grouped under the cultural and symbolic violence perspective contend that a 
prevailing machismo culture in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras contributes to ongoing 
cycles of gender-based violence. In “The Myths of Violence: Gender, Conflict, and Community 
in El Salvador,” Hume (2008) observes how violence forms a cycle in El Salvador, one in which 
“gender identities are intimately linked to the performance of violence” and greater social-
economic-political structures reinforce gender hierarchies as well as the discursive and material 
practice of violence. (2008, p. 60) Drawing from interviews and participatory workshops 
conducted in a self-help group for men convicted of domestic violence in two low-income 
communities, Hume assesses the role of symbolic structures in cycles of violence; more 
specifically, she examines the family, state, and community as “productive sites of violence.” 
(2008, p. 72) In one example, Hume reflects on the testimony of a male study participant, who was 
physically and emotionally abused as a child, to understand how and why Salvadoran men and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 See Discussion Section for a breakdown of Galtung’s (1969, 1990) violence triangle and 
Menjívar’s (2008, 2011) multisided violence frameworks.!
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boys are taught to “be firm.” These symbolic gender constructions, she then argues, ensure that 
“domination and its associated use of violence have ensured and reproduced male privilege, and 
this model has been consistently reinforced by wider social and cultural practices.” (2008, p. 65)  
In the article “Femicide in Central America: Is Creating Female-Friendly Urban Zones 
Really the Solution?,” Alex McAnarney (2012), director of communication at the Center for 
Justice and International Law, discusses Ciudad Mujer—government-sponsored centers—in El 
Salvador. In these centralized spaces, women can access a range of services that relate to the 
protection of women’s rights, sexual and reproductive health, and childcare. In this piece, 
McAnarney voices the concerns of Salvadoran feminist groups about Ciudad Mujer, many of 
whom question whether the initiative offers a long-term solution to gender-based violence; for 
long-term change, they argue, changing a culture of machismo10 and marianismo11 is necessary. 
Additionally, McAnarney critiques the Salvadoran government for enforcing an absolute ban on 
abortion, while simultaneously “protecting” women through Ciudad Mujer. 
Political and Legal Violence 
The literature grouped under the political and legal violence category broadly looks at how 
gaps in law enforcement, judicial, and legislative frameworks in Central American countries 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10!Machismo is a concept “characterized by an overt, active heterosexuality” and hypermasculinity 
(Hardin, 2002, p. 3). Historically, machismo has been applied “to any male trait within Latin 
America, especially if it can be related to male sexuality or power” and presented as a phenomenon 
that “most notably manifest[s] among lower-class men.” (Hardin, 2002, p. 2). Due to its 
stereotypical and individualistic nature, I refrain from integrating the concept of machismo into 
my analysis. 
!
11!Originally developed by Stevens (1973),!marianismo is a concept that constructs archetypes of 
women within a heteropatriarchal social framework. Hardin (2002) elaborates that marianismo 
“reduc[es] a woman’s models to venerated virgin-mother and reviled whore-mother, neither of 
which allow a woman much latitude for a real identity.” (p. 1–2) Any woman who is not considered 
virginal, chaste, righteous, and/or pure is, therefore, deemed a “bad woman.” In turn, “good 
women” support heteropatriarchy.!
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contribute to cycles of gender-based violence. In “The Guatemalan Femicide: An Epidemic of 
Impunity,” legal expert Natalie Velasco (2008) argues that Guatemala’s institutional infrastructure 
is a major setback to laws designed to target gender-based violence, as evidenced by inadequate 
resources, delayed initiation of investigations, and failure to preserve the crime scene and collect 
evidence. Law enforcement, judicial and legislative systems have essentially permitted structural 
impunity to thrive, thus preventing any significant progress. To highlight how law enforcement 
systems and institutions exacerbate cycles of violence, Velasco draws from numerous Guatemalan 
case studies, such as that of Claudina Isabel Velásquez Paiz (who was murdered) and Rodi 
Alvarado (who escaped from her abuser and sought asylum in the United States).   
Velasco (2008) also draws attention to Guatemalan national efforts to prevent violence 
against women, including the ratification of the Convention of Belém do Pará, the creation of the 
National Coordinator for the Prevention of Domestic Violence and Violence Against Women 
(CONAPREVI), and the establishment of a Special Commission on Femicide. In her critique of 
the Guatemalan state’s response to the Convention of Belém do Pará, she notes that “the temporary 
suspension of article 200 [of the Guatemalan Penal Code] that allows rapists to escape culpability 
by marrying their victims is a prime example of how domestic law conflicts with the Convention 
obligations.” (2008, p. 414) Her analysis of the ways in which domestic law in Guatemala conflicts 
with the Convention of Belém do Pará parallels anthropologist Ana María Alonso’s (1995) 
discussion of domestic violence law and its rationalization of patriarchy in nineteenth-century 
Chihuahua, Mexico. Alonso claims that “legislation criminalizing domestic violence in Mexico 
was part and parcel of a project of state formation that transformed and rationalized rather than 
undermined patriarchy,” exemplified by the economic dependency of many women who reported 
incidents of domestic violence. (1995, p. 30) Alonso recalls how women would often retract claims 
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against their husband’s abuses after realizing they could not survive without their partner’s 
financial support. 
In their article “Crimes Without Punishment: An Update on Violence Against Women and 
Impunity in Guatemala,” Musalo and Bookey (2014) discuss some of the structural obstacles to 
policies designed to combat gender-based violence. For instance, they claim that language barriers 
and geographic location pose a challenge to Indigenous Maya women who attempt to report 
incidents of violence to authorities. Musalo and Bookey also note that “deeply rooted patterns of 
discrimination in society” have helped normalize gender-based violence in Guatemalan culture. 
(2014, p. 106) Similar to Musalo and Bookey (2014), Velasco (2008) looks at how crucial law 
enforcement officers are in making or breaking cycles of violence. She notes that police officers 
place women in precarious situations whenever they ignore reports of missing women. These 
institutional weaknesses may be attributed to issues such as systemically embedded impunity, as 
well as other symbolic and economic factors.  
Structural and Economic Violence 
The readings I grouped under the structural and economic violence category assess how 
structural forms of violence and neoliberal economic reforms expose women to further violence. 
Rebecca Vonderlack-Navarro (2010), a senior policy analyst at the Latino Policy Forum, assesses 
the effects of the Génesis Microfinance Program initiated in the Honduran capital city of 
Tegucigalpa. Though the program’s objective is to help Honduran women gain economic 
autonomy and work their way out of the informal sector through self-employment, Vonderlack-
Navarro argues that the program’s sole focus on women is not sufficient; the Génesis Microfinance 
Program overlooks the nature of family dynamics in Honduras and men’s roles in the 
macroeconomic structure. Drawing from program observation, 40 semi-structured interviews with 
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participants, and interviews with Génesis program staff, Vonderlack-Navarro observes that some 
men—after witnessing their wives generate a form of income through the program—developed 
“machista excuses” and resorted to alcohol abuse, infidelity or desertion, when unable to provide 
sufficient financial support for their families. Consequently, several of the women in the study 
faced direct risk of repeated victimization, as their partners responded to their economic autonomy 
with other forms of violence.  
Prieto-Carrón et al. (2007) find correlations between the rising number of femicides and 
an increase in women’s economic autonomy in Central America. To assert their point, they note 
that an unequal and hierarchical globalized economy has pushed many Central American women 
to secure some form of employment as maquila workers. Prieto-Carrón et al. claim that these 
women, who fight for survival in a precarious neoliberal global market, are deemed “sexual objects 
lacking value, worth and respectability as a result of their structural position in the global 
economy.” (2007, p. 30) The neoliberal global economic order thus relegates working class women 
as worthless, temporary, and disposable. 
Linking Multisided Violence with Gender-Based Violence 
In a speech delivered to a United Nations conference on “Global Strategies for Achieving 
Fairness in the Courts: Domestic Violence” in Geneva, Switzerland in February 1992, feminist 
legal scholar Catharine MacKinnon connects notions of cultural and symbolic violence with 
international legal and historical legacies to explain how and why violence against women remains 
a major global human rights concern. In her speech, MacKinnon (2007) claims that viewing 
violence against women as a human rights issue “changes what you see or should: the family that 
breeds it, the customs that justify it, the cultural specificity that hides it, the religion that excuses 
or sanctifies it, the wars that make its organized quality official, the legal notions like torture that 
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exclude it, [and] the institutions of law enforcement that essentially legalize it.” (p. 32) The family 
values, customs, cultural specificity, and religion MacKinnon highlights recall cultural and 
symbolic violence, while wars, legal notions, and law enforcement connect with political and legal 
violence. Fragile institutions, embedded gender inequalities, systemic impunity, and 
socioeconomic hierarchies characterize socio-political-economic structures in Guatemala, El 
Salvador, and Honduras. Yet, it helps to understand that fragility in one area draws connections to 
those in others. For example, unless normative gender expectations are reassessed and challenged, 
the likelihood that institutional and economic reform will holistically prevent, sanction, and 
eradicate violence against women is unlikely.  
CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
Fieldwork Logistics 
 This study draws upon sociologically-based fieldwork I carried out in Costa Rica and 
Guatemala in August 2019. I conducted eight in-depth, semi-structured interviews in Spanish with 
administrators from women’s and human rights organizations based in San José, Costa Rica, 
Guatemala City, Guatemala, and San Salvador, El Salvador. Interviews lasted between 60 to 120 
minutes. I later transcribed and translated the data into English. In Costa Rica, I visited the National 
Archives, National Library, Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres [National Institute of Women] 
(INAMU), and the Centro de Investigación en Estudios de la Mujer [Research Center on Women’s 
Studies] (CIEM). In the National Archives, I reviewed government records, such as 
correspondences between the Minister for the Status of Women and the INAMU from 2004 to 
2014. Some of these correspondences included proposals to create a specialized national center to 
address sexual violence and calls for the Ministry of Education to incorporate violence prevention 
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programs into the national school curriculum. At the National Library, INAMU and CIEM, I 
collected academic literature, policy briefs, and data reports on gender-based violence in Costa 
Rica and other Central American countries.  
In addition to archival and library research, I conducted in-person interviews with 
administrators from two women’s organizations based in San José: Centro Feminista de 
Información y Acción [Feminist Information and Action Center] (CEFEMINA) and Asociación 
Ciudadana ACCEDER (Acciones Estratégicas por los Derechos Humanos) [Citizen Association 
ACCEDER (Strategic Actions for Human Rights)].12 CEFEMINA promotes the self-organization 
of communities and groups interested in defending human rights, as well as the development of 
regional and national solidarity networks for women (CEFEMINA, 2012). Asociación Ciudadana 
ACCEDER provides legal and political advocacy to prevent and eradicate violence and 
discrimination based on gender, sexual orientation, and gender identity (ACCEDER, 2020). 
During my stay in Costa Rica, I also conducted an interview over the phone with an administrator 
from Movimiento Salvadoreño de Mujeres [Salvadoran Women’s Movement], a women’s 
organization based in San Salvador. This organization develops projects and campaigns that 
promote the economic, political, social, cultural and environmental rights of rural and urban 
women. (MSM, 2020)  
 In Guatemala City, I visited the National Library to gather local literature on gender-based 
violence, but focused the bulk of my efforts on interviews with human rights and women’s 
organizations. I conducted in-depth, semi-structured interviews with representatives from five 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12! Selena, a graduate student from the University of Costa Rica whose research focuses on 
women’s rights in Central America, was also present during my interviews with administrators 
from CEFEMINA and Asociación Ciudadana ACCEDER. My thesis committee chair, Dr. Cecilia 
Menjívar, put us in touch prior to my arrival “in the field”; Selena is one of her international 
research associates. 
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organizations/institutes based in the capital city: Fundación Sobrevivientes [Survivor’s 
Foundation], Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales [Latin American Faculty of Social 
Sciences] (FLACSO), Grupo Guatemalteco de Mujeres [Guatemalan Women’s Group], 
Observatorio en Salud Sexual y Reproductiva [Sexual and Reproductive Health Observatory] 
(OSAR), and Colectiva para la Defensa de los Derechos de las Mujeres [Collective for the Defense 
of Women’s Rights] (CODEFEM).  
Fundación Sobrevivientes provides specialized care and temporary shelter to women, 
children, and adolescents who have been victims of physical, psychological, and sexual violence. 
(Fundación Sobrevivientes, 2020) FLACSO is an intergovernmental organization with chapters in 
several Latin American countries; the Guatemalan chapter hosts teaching and research programs 
that encourage critical thinking, national development, and democracy. (FLACSO-Guatemala, 
2020) Grupo Guatemalteco de Mujeres pushes for public policies that address oppression, 
subordination, discrimination, and racism in Guatemalan society. (GGM, 2020) OSAR collects 
data to measure advances in the implementation of policies on sexual and reproductive health in 
Guatemala. (OSAR, 2020) Lastly, since its inception, CODEFEM has initiated and contributed to 
the reform of laws on gender-based violence in Guatemala in accordance with CEDAW and the 
Convention of Belém do Pará. (CODEFEM, 2020) I spoke with one representative from each 
organization, with the exception of CODEFEM; two administrators were present for the interview. 
Research Epistemology 
!
 I adopted a feminist, decolonial epistemology for this study. As a feminist researcher, I 
strived to be transparent about my own biases throughout the research process because, as Haraway 
(1988, 1991) argues and Llewelyn (2007) reminds us, “our social positions and personal identities 
shape our understanding of a particular event, process, or thing . . . [and] accurate knowledge 
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claims can only originate from a position that is explicitly partial, located, and therefore 
accountable.” (p. 300) I understood that, as a graduate student from UCLA, an institution in the 
Global North and specifically in the United States, my research participants would likely have 
preconceived notions of who I am and my beliefs. However, as Wright (2006) notes, I say this 
with caution because I do not have “the appropriate knowledge to know fully what ‘others’ think 
of me or a perspective outside of myself to relate some version of how I appear in the field.” (p. 
15) To avoid reifying hierarchical, gendered relations of power that often marginalize women 
during research processes, this study frames women as agents and producers of knowledge who 
can improve their social positions, rather than as beneficiaries. (Molyneux, 1985; Connelly, Li, 
MacDonald, and Parpart, 2000; Beetham and Demetriades, 2007, p. 201) To strengthen the quality 
of my interviews, I aimed to balance relations of power between myself and participants, which 
Oakley (1981) claims is “best achieved when the relationship of interviewer and interviewee is 
non-hierarchical and when the interviewer is prepared to invest his or her own personal identity in 
the relationship.” (p. 41) To achieve this, I strived to establish a comfortable and secure interview 
environment and made clear to my informants that I was there to learn from their expertise. Prior 
to the start of an interview, I also informed participants that they were free to ask me any questions 
about myself and the study at any point throughout our conversation. 
For my decolonial epistemology, I draw from Coddington’s (2017) two responses to the 
“accounting of research and its doing”: proceeding and refusing. In proceeding with this research, 
I remained transparent about my “funding, career stage, [and] time limitations,” as these factors 
all shaped the decisions I had to make in the course of my project. (Coddington, 2017, p. 318) In 
terms of “refusing” to engage in the research if it poses too many risks for participants, I 
deliberately chose not to interview victims of gender-based violence (or their families) since it 
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may have exposed them to great danger. Because victims and their families have already shared 
their experiences with others in the past (Bellino, 2010), I intend to contextualize the stories that 
have been shared with what representatives from women’s organizations and other key informants 
are saying about gender-based violence in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. 
Research Methodology 
 Because this project looks at numerous laws that address gender-based forms of violence 
in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, it is a multiple case study. This variant of case study 
research includes two or more observations of the same phenomenon. (Santos and Eisenhardt, 
2004, p. 684) I selected Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras with the extreme case method, 
which, Gerring (2007) claims and Walsh and Menjívar (2016) recall, “focuses on cases with 
extreme outcomes such as notable successes or failures.” (2016, p. 592) A multiple case study 
approach allowed me to more critically examine policies on gender-based violence in these three 
countries as I drew from different data sources. As with all methodologies, there are drawbacks to 
a case study approach, such as the study’s comparative potential. Due to a small sample size and 
because my case study research is situated in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, the 
qualitative data cannot be generalized, at the empirical level, to other countries and regions. For 
this reason, as Chang, Torrez, Ferguson, and Sagar (2017) state, I simply use the “individual 
experiences [of my informants], as well as commonalities among them, as a launching point into 
a much larger, complex, and nuanced conversation” about gender-based violence and policy in 
these countries. (p. 211) 
Research Methods 
Though research methods are, arguably, politically neutral, researchers can adopt a certain 
epistemology based on the tools they use and why. (Hoare, 2007, p. 181) I integrated a feminist, 
! 30 
decolonial epistemology in my work by using in-depth, semi-structured interviews and discourse 
analysis. Semi-structured interviews have strengths and limitations. On the one hand, they allowed 
me to collect diverse perspectives, as informants had greater freedom to steer the conversation 
toward any relevant points of discussion that were not explicitly mentioned in my questions. Due 
to my position as an outside researcher, interviewees may have also felt more comfortable sharing 
their thoughts with me because I would not spread gossip within the local community. On the other 
hand, outsider status made securing a level of trust with which the representatives of the women’s 
organizations felt comfortable discussing their thoughts and work with me an ambiguous process.  
 The organizations I interacted with came about from a combination of non-probability 
sampling methods, which include snowball, purposive, and convenience sampling. My contact 
with OSAR, CODEFEM, FLACSO, CEFEMINA, and Asociación Ciudadana ACCEDER came 
from snowball sampling methods. Because all of my participants were representatives from human 
rights or women’s organizations, I also used purposive sampling.13 Some organizations I 
discovered through my survey of the literature; for instance, I heard about Movimiento 
Salvadoreño de Mujeres through Hume (2008) and Zulver’s (2016) work in El Salvador, and 
Fundación Sobrevivientes and Grupo Guatemalteco de Mujeres through Méndez Gutiérrez’s 
(2013) work on Guatemala. Ultimately, I contacted as many organizations/institutes as I could find 
that, in one capacity or another, promote gender equality and women’s rights in each of the 
countries. Because this work only features those that responded to my request for an interview, I 
also employed convenience sampling, meaning that I chose informants depending on their 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 According to Shantikumar (2018), purposive sampling “relies on the judgment of the researcher 
when choosing who to ask to participate. Researchers may implicitly thus choose a ‘representative’ 
sample to suit their needs, or specifically approach individuals with certain characters.” 
McCombes (2019) claims this sampling method is best used “to gain detailed knowledge about a 
specific phenomenon.” 
! 31 
availability and willingness to participate. (Shantikumar, 2018) The strengths of snowballing, 
purposive, and convenience sampling methods, particularly in a qualitative study such as this one, 
include their time- and cost-effective nature. All of these methods are, however, prone to volunteer 
bias, meaning that volunteers are not representative of the greater population. However, because 
this study focuses on dialogues with representatives from women’s organizations, volunteer bias 
is not as great a cause of concern as it would be for a study that aims to test a hypothesis about a 
broader participant demographic. (McCombes, 2019) Regardless, I remain conscientious of the 
fact that I conducted a limited number of interviews, and am cautious in making generalizations 
based on the data I collected. 
As discussed in my research epistemology, I deliberately chose not to interview victims of 
gender-based violence to avoid possible safety risks. This does not mean, however, that the 
administrators I spoke to within the organizations are not victims themselves. Given how 
systemically and systematically structural, symbolic, and gendered violence are embedded in the 
social fabric, it is possible that most (if not all) of the women I spoke to experienced some form of 
violence in their lifetime. The women in these organizations, however, likely understand the risks 
that come with openly working towards the advancement of women's rights, especially because 
they work in the public eye.14 Because I am aware of these risks, I made efforts to protect their 
safety in this study. I assign pseudonyms to all of my interviewees and avoid disclosing details 
about their position within their respective organizations. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 These risks may come at the hands of the state or clandestine groups aiming to disrupt the work 
of human rights and women’s organizations. In 2001, for instance, a group of armed men broke 
into the offices of a women’s organization in Guatemala City; they beat and raped the women who 
were in the office at the time. (Sanford, 2008, p. 118) 
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Unfortunately, time constraints prevented me from interviewing key informants such as 
policymakers, femicrats/bureaucrats (i.e. judges, prosecutors), law experts, and law enforcement 
officials. Due to this imbalance in my methodological experience, and to somewhat account for 
these important perspectives, I conducted political discourse analysis by monitoring official social 
media posts and closely listening to speeches of former and current government officials to observe 
how they speak publicly about gender-based violence.  
Ethical Guidelines 
  This study received a certificate of exemption from the University of California, Los 
Angeles (UCLA) Institutional Review Board (IRB). In compliance with UCLA IRB regulations, 
I completed the Human Research for Social and Behavioral Researchers and Staff virtual course 
administered by the Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative (CITI) Program. Digital audio 
recording was an optional part of the interview process; I never shared recordings with anyone 
outside of the research team, which consisted of the principal investigator (myself) and my faculty 
supervisor, Dr. Cecilia Menjívar. I conducted participant recruitment and consent processes over 
email correspondence because the research posed minimal risk to the participants. I carried out all 
written and spoken communication with informants in Spanish because this is the predominant 
language spoken in urban areas of Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. 
CHAPTER 4 
DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
Discourse Analysis 
Drawing from Judith Butler’s claim that “the materialization of a given sex” centrally 
concerns “the regulation of identificatory practices” in public discourse (1993, p. 3), I conducted 
discourse analysis to explore how societal views on violence (particularly against women) are 
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shaped and molded by representations of femicide/feminicide, sexual violence, and intrafamily 
violence in official communications.  
El Salvador 
Quite recently, representations of crimes against women as “crimes of passion” have shone 
through in Salvadoran political discourse, as evidenced by a Tweet from President Nayib Bukele 
in July 2019: “This Monday, El Salvador only had one homicide and it is not related to gangs. It 
was a feminicide of passion (definitely something we must pay attention to). There is no doubt 
that the #PlanControlTerritorial is working. I reiterate the call for all to support it.” (Bukele, 2019 
July 15) In this Tweet, Bukele celebrates the fact that his Plan Control Territorial is reducing gang-
related violence in El Salvador. In doing so, however, he downplays the murder of 35-year-old 
Keni Guadalupe Larios as merely a “feminicide of passion.” Though this explanation pinpoints a 
possible suspect in the crime, it does little to explain why the assassination of women is so 
normalized as to be justified as a “crime of passion.” As a result, crimes against women become a 
part of the everyday social fabric, which then justifies the widespread impunity that most of these 
crimes receive in El Salvador, but also in Guatemala and Honduras. Because these “passionate 
crimes” occur between intimate partners, they are relegated to the private sphere and are therefore, 
not a pressing responsibility for the state to address (as would likely be the case with gang 
violence). In labelling this murder a response from a jealous partner, Bukele creates an 
individualistic account of the motives behind the crime; he fails to assess how the commonality of 
everyday violence, which he justifies as a “crime of passion,” stems, in part, from the use of 
widespread state terror during the country’s internal armed conflict (1980–1992). Bukele’s rhetoric 
is also harmful because it comes from a place of political power, and therefore, may appear as the 
“ultimate truth.” The president is a national figure whose actions and rhetoric influence the way 
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that civil society and law enforcement officials assess the crimes that are worth prosecuting and 
those that are not. 
Political discourse on violence against women also comes in the form of speeches. Prior to 
Bukele, Salvador Sánchez Cerén, of the left-wing Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front 
(FMLN) party, served as president from 2014 to 2019. The Sánchez Cerén administration’s 
rhetoric on violence against women upheld gender social roles and attitudes in accordance with 
Catholic and Evangelical religious values. At a general debate of the 73rd session of the UN 
General Assembly in September 2018, Sánchez Cerén said the following about government 
initiatives that address violence against women:  
As part of the defense of women’s rights, we developed a Strategy for the Prevention of 
Feminicide and Sexual Violence, which involves all government institutions to empower 
women and guarantee them a life free of violence. This strategy has been strengthened with 
the Spotlight Initiative,15 supported by the European Union and the United Nations, which 
seeks the eradication of social and institutional practices that harm the dignity of women. 
(Sánchez Cerén, 2018 Sept. 26; emphasis added) 
 
Sánchez Cerén starts off by claiming that these initiatives are meant to “empower women and 
guarantee them a life free of violence.” While this language is somewhat standard in policy, it is 
his understanding of the Spotlight Initiative as a tool to “eradicate social practices and institutions 
that harm the dignity of women” that illustrates more clearly his personal understanding of 
women’s rights. President Mauricio Funes, Sánchez Cerén’s predecessor, used similar language 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Launched in 2017, the Spotlight Initiative is a global, multi-year partnership between the 
European Union and the United Nations to eliminate all forms of violence against women and girls 
by 2030, especially “domestic and family violence, sexual and gender-based violence and harmful 
practices, femicide, trafficking in human beings and sexual and economic (labour) exploitation.” 
(Spotlight Initiative, 2020) Program interventions “focus on six mutually-reinforcing 
programming pillars”: laws and policies, institutions, prevention, services, data, and women’s 
movements. (Spotlight Initiative, 2020) 
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in a speech at the inauguration of Ciudad Mujer16 in Usulután in September 2012: “Well, women, 
this reality is going to change and nobody is going to stop it from changing! No one is going to 
impede or set us back in this effort. These threats to the integrity of women are what we have set 
out to combat since we [the Funes administration] came to govern.” (Funes and Pignato, 2012 
Sept. 30; emphasis added) Both Sánchez Cerén and Funes implicitly contextualize crimes against 
women as harmful or threatening to a woman’s honor and respectability, as the terms they use 
(dignity and integrity) are often connoted with qualities of honor, respect, honesty, and morality. 
This rhetoric falls in line with Catholic and Evangelical values, such as the expectation of women 
to be honorable, pure, and innocent.  
In a Message to the Nation in March 2016, Sánchez Cerén also reacts to violent criminal 
groups in El Salvador: “Criminal gangs have committed horrendous murders that our society 
cannot tolerate. These criminals have reached extremes of savagery, loss of all human sensitivity. 
They murder girls and boys, students, pregnant women, religious [figures], the elderly and even 
people with disabilities.” (Sánchez Cerén, 2016 Mar. 30) Although this message is not restricted 
to crimes against women, it once again plays into the ideals of dignity, honor, and respectability. 
Sánchez Cerén seems to place greater value on “pure and innocent” bodies (i.e. pregnant women, 
religious figures, the elderly) than on those living in the “margins of society.” Thus, Sánchez Cerén 
antagonizes certain perpetrators and victims of violence, such as gang members and sex workers, 
respectively. These narratives criminalize poor, young men and deem them unworthy of human 
life. Rather than focusing on the historic structural and political conditions that lead many men 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Founded in 2011, Ciudad Mujer is a network of government-sponsored centers in El Salvador 
that assist victims of gender-based violence, as well as offer educational, career, financial, and 
health services for women. Spearheaded by former First Lady and Secretary of Social Inclusion 
Vanda Pignato, Ciudad Mujer has since expanded to six centers across El Salvador. (Ciudad Mujer, 
2020) 
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and women into gangs and sex work for survival, this rhetoric dehumanizes and scapegoats those 
on the “fringes of society” for all sorts of crimes.  
Public discourse on violence against women abounded during the political administration 
of left-wing President Mauricio Funes (2009-2014). Under Funes’ leadership, the First Lady and 
Secretary of Social Inclusion, Vanda Pignato, primarily spoke publicly on issues related to 
violence against women. In November 2011, Pignato gave a speech at the inaugural forum debate 
“The violence that becomes invisible,” in which she said: “We all know that behind violence 
against women there exists a patriarchal society that considers women as objects. Objects on 
which property is exercised, on which determination is exercised, and which is [inaudible] through 
pleasure.” (Pignato, 2011 Dec. 5; emphasis added) Pignato’s reference to a patriarchal society 
shies away from an individualistic explanation of violence, such as machismo, which allows crimes 
against women to be understood in a wider societal context. Though she emphasizes how social 
perceptions of women can instigate gender-based violence, she also overlooks how histories of 
state terror have contributed to the normalization of violence as a response to “breaches” in 
expected social roles. Holding the state accountable, therefore, would require an understanding of 
the factors that normalize the use of everyday violence against women (and men). Thus, when 
assessing causes or motives for violence, it is essential to question why perpetrators deem it an 
appropriate/normal response to different situations, such as jealousy, infidelity, and social status.   
Following her speech on patriarchal societies in 2011, Pignato would go on to make another 
critical statement the following year. At an unprecedented meeting in June 2012, she met with 
government cabinet officials to construct a joint strategy to fulfill President Funes’ mandate for 
the prevention and eradication of violence against women. During this meeting, she repeats the 
following statement twice for emphasis: “The President of the Republic is telling us that gender 
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violence against women is a public security issue and not limited to the private sphere.” (Pignato, 
2012 June 18) She declares that forms of violence traditionally relegated to the private sphere, 
such as intrafamily or domestic violence, should be viewed as a public safety concern and, 
therefore, the state’s responsibility to address. At the end of this same speech, Pignato concludes: 
“We will not eradicate gender violence against women in two years, not even in consecutive years. 
It is not about a political change, but rather a cultural change, a social change, which begins by 
recognizing that women are subjects with equal rights.” (Pignato, 2012 June 18) While her call for 
social change is important, Pignato overlooks the value of political change. Diminishing 
widespread impunity—perpetuated by the state’s failure to properly investigate and prosecute most 
reported crimes—would require institutional reform so that more women are not only afforded 
access to systems of justice, but are also encouraged to report if necessary. Pignato, however, notes 
the importance of political and law enforcement actors in another speech the following day at the 
“Leaders’ Forum on the Future of Women: Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment for 
Sustainable Development” in Río de Janeiro: “In El Salvador . . . women’s rights face strong 
prejudice and conservatism from the justice system, the public ministry, and the police. As long 
as these actors do not do their part, sustainable development will not have the necessary support 
to become consolidated” (Pignato, 2012 June 19). Pignato addresses the importance of the justice 
system, public ministry, and law enforcement officers in securing gender equality and the 
eradication of violence against women. These institutions must have the political will to override 
systems of corruption and ensure that crimes are prosecuted to the fullest extent under the law. 
Guatemala 
 As is the case in El Salvador, politicians in Guatemala have been vocal about gender-based 
violence and violence against women in public discourse. A recurring theme in each of the three 
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countries, especially in Guatemala, is the reinforcement of women’s “feminine” social roles. At 
the Seventh Congress “Guatemalan Women Leaders: Discover the Meaning of your Life” in 
October 2012, the Vice President of Guatemala at the time, Roxana Baldetti, said women can “do 
almost, almost anything that men can do. And I say almost because men are hard workers, they 
are loving, they are responsible. You can do anything else perfectly well, but never let them take 
away your femininity, never take away the thought of dreaming and truly wanting to get ahead as 
women.” (Baldetti, 2012 Oct. 3) Baldetti implores the members of the audience not to lose sight 
of their dreams and prospects for a better life. As she does this, she recalls features that she believes 
make them women: gentleness and femininity. Though it may not have been her intent, Baldetti’s 
attention to these characteristics reminds women of the social roles they are expected to fulfill; this 
may imply that those who transgress their “delicate” feminine nature deserve to be punished and 
put in their place by romantic partners, family members, and on a larger scale, the state. Clearly, 
this indicates how constructions of femininity and masculinity justify the way people behave, as 
well as justify punishments for them when they fail to act accordingly. In another speech in 
February 2013 at the Inaugural Seminar on the Participation of Cooperative Women, Baldetti once 
again employs stereotypical constructions of femininity to get her point across:  
We [women] have things, actually, that we can share if we don’t start and if we don’t fight 
over who looks prettier, who wore better makeup, who put on the best earrings. If we really 
fight for the progress of us as women. If we really fight without envy or wanting to tear 
down a woman because she is enduring or fulfilling her [social] role well. On the contrary, 
[we must] support that woman so that we can achieve through her those goals that we have 
set as women. (Baldetti, 2013 Feb. 19)  
 
In a counterintuitive effort to reinforce solidarity among women, Baldetti draws on the stereotype 
of the jealous woman who tears others down over beauty and success. Her comments, while 
innocuous at first glance, seemingly blame women for the lack of social progress; she claims that 
the fight for women’s rights will only grow if they stop tearing each other down. The stereotypical 
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representation of jealous women who pine over beauty, makeup, and jewelry is harmful to the 
work that the women’s movement and organizations have done to push forward for gender 
equality. It creates the illusion that they are incapable of thinking about and acting on deeper 
societal issues. If the dominant narrative becomes about women engaging in catfights over 
superficial topics, then arguably, a male-dominated legislature, judiciary, and law enforcement 
system cannot and will not take the fight for women’s rights seriously at the implementation, 
enforcement, and prosecution level.  
In public discourse, Guatemalan political figures have also praised the family as a social 
unit, and more specifically, the importance of a woman’s role within the family. In August 2013, 
Vice President Roxana Baldetti emphasized the importance of women being a light in their 
families to a room of female entrepreneurs: “Whatever you do, as small or as great as it may be, 
do it with love. That is the great magic word that we can give, and the soul has to radiate light. 
You have to be a light for your companies, you have to be a light for your family, you have to be 
a light for Guatemala because Guatemala needs a lot of light.” (Baldetti, 2013 Aug. 28; emphasis 
added) In a March 2016 speech directed toward female entrepreneurs enrolled in the Creciendo 
Seguro program,17 the First Lady of Guatemala at the time, Hilda Patricia Marroquin de Morales, 
used a similar rhetoric to highlight the social roles that women play as mothers and income-
generators in their households: “It is our job to encourage many companies to join in supporting 
and collaborating so that you can train and thus have more income and be able to help your 
families. We, women, are very important in our families. And well, I congratulate you and urge 
you to continue doing that and to be an example for our children.” (Marroquin de Morales, 2016 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Piloted by the Guatemalan government, the Creciendo Seguro program “facilitates 
multisectorial efforts to strengthen food and nutrition security and the economic-productive 
capacity of families vulnerable to” food insecurity. (Gobierno de Guatemala, 2020) 
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Mar. 31; emphasis added) Marroquin de Morales’ language is reminiscent of development 
discourse that views women’s labor as instrumental to national economic wealth, rather than for 
their own rights. Additionally, Baldetti and Marroquin de Morales impose a restrictive social role 
on these female entrepreneurs, reminding them that at the end of the day, their most important role 
is that of a mother that upholds her household in everything she does. The perception of women 
as foundations in familial networks can also be seen in former Guatemalan President Jimmy 
Morales’ rhetoric. Morales, whose presidential term ran from 2016 to 2020, said the following in 
a November 2016 speech at a forum sponsored by Asociación La Familia Importa:18  
I have always said it and I have tried to live it and it is to value the importance of the family, 
the family as the basis of society, marriage as a pact of life between two beings who love 
each other and the fulfillment of human rights as a guarantee of the state of law. As you 
know, I am not in favor of abortion. I will always be in favor of life, family, and marriage. 
(Morales, 2016 Nov. 12) 
 
Morales’ pro-life stance draws strong ties to Catholic and Evangelical religious values that 
condemn abortion. This is not only made clear by his declaration of being in favor of life, but also 
by the connections he draws between life, family, and marriage. To Morales, these three social 
units are the very foundation of society. His emphasis on these principles, therefore, constructs 
Guatemalan national values around the patriarchal family. These values are also reflected in 
national laws. Article 7 of the Guatemalan Law for the Dignification and Integral Promotion of 
Women, for example, states that the “Guatemalan Nation is made up of different peoples with 
different ways of life, customs, traditions, forms of social organization and language, which have 
their foundation in the family, for which reason, the State protects and respects the family.” 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Asociación La Familia Importa is a platform for citizens to promote the protection and 
strengthening of the family in Guatemala. This association organizes trainings and talks on life, 
family, and liberty, develops political and legal strategies to protect the family at the national and 
international level, as well as produces print and online publications to influence popular opinion 
in favor of the family unit. (AFI Guatemala, 2018) 
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(República de Guatemala, 1999) Reflecting this rhetoric, Morales ultimately indicates that the 
state’s protection and investment is best spent on those who sustain the patriarchal family, as they 
form part of the trifecta that consolidates a healthy, stable, and righteous society.  
Honduras 
 In Honduras, public discourse has focused, in part, on violence in the public and private 
sphere and the role of the family in changing a “culture” of violence. Most of this discourse comes 
from President Juan Orlando Hernández, who has been in office since 2014. Similar to El 
Salvador’s former First Lady Vanda Pignato, Hernández attempts to blur the line between violence 
in the public and the private sphere in a February 2019 speech on Honduras’ participation in the 
Spotlight Initiative:  
I was recently in Olancho reviewing with FUSINA19 issues of insecurity and there was a 
report that drew a lot of attention. A sad, regrettable attack of such magnitude on a woman 
with the use of a machete. And then the other phenomenon that caught our attention was 
that the argument for each—we would say out of every 100, 60, 70—criminal incidents 
had to do, they said in quotes, with personal issues. Things we had not seen anywhere else. 
Then in Intibucá we were reviewing and there was also talk of personal issues. In the end, 
it was the argument used to see how problems were solved with violence, and that cannot 
be. That . . . can be solved if we work with children and young people to change the culture. 
(Hernández, 2019 Feb. 13; emphasis added) 
 
In this excerpt from his speech, Hernández seems to take issue with the fact that most reported 
crimes in the departments of Olancho and Intibucá are labelled as “personal problems.” Classifying 
crimes against women as personal issues follows a similar rhetoric to “crimes of passion.” By 
identifying them as personal issues, these crimes are relegated to the private sphere where the state 
purportedly has no involvement. Hernández makes a breakthrough assessment of how different 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 FUSINA refers to the Fuerza de Seguridad Interinstitucional Nacional [National Inter-
Institutional Security Force]. It is a military-led task force comprised of representatives from 
various Honduran security units. FUSINA is tasked with “capturing high-profile gang members 
and drug traffickers” and running an “anti-extortion unit that controls phone intercepts,” among 
other responsibilities. (Kinosian, 2015)!
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crimes are treated and addressed by the authorities in Honduras by drawing them away from an 
individualistic approach and looking at them within a greater context.20 Yet, the ending statements 
of this excerpt seem to suggest otherwise. Though Hernández claims that problems cannot be 
solved with violence, it is the very same approach that FUSINA, under his leadership, has used to 
stake out gangs and organized criminal groups.21 Additionally, he states it is important to work 
with the younger generations to change a culture of violence in Honduras; this seemingly lifts the 
“burden” off of the state for its history of state terror, which has arguably set a precedent for the 
use of violence in everyday life to “resolve personal problems.” It seemingly strips the state of its 
responsibility to investigate reported crimes against women, as his statement instead emphasizes 
the work that future generations must do to change cultural discourse in Honduras. Hernández 
continues to push these ideas forward at the end of the same speech: 
It is a commitment that our entire society must take on: each father of the family, each 
mother of the family, each teacher, each spiritual leader in the different churches, the 
media, different organizations, because today the world is characterized by constant 
confrontation and a polarization that we have rarely seen in history.22 We must work on 
this to promote respect, consideration, love amongst us. (Hernández, 2019 Feb. 13) 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 In his speech, Hernández attributes these understandings to the decades-long commitment of 
feminist groups in Honduras that have been confronting and addressing violence against women 
and girls.  
!
21!The Honduran government used similar tactics following the military coup d’état in 2009. 
(Gervais and Estévez, 2011) 
 
22!Hernández does not clarify what he means by “constant confrontation and polarization” in his 
speech. However, following some brief research, I discovered that an audience member, Olivia 
Zúñiga, interrupted Hernández’s speech by shouting, “Get out JOH [Juan Orlando Hernández], 
justice for Berta [Cáceres] and murderer.” (EFE, 2019) The speech uploaded by the Honduran 
government’s official YouTube account, Casa Presidencial Honduras, had Zúñiga’s protest edited 
out. Zúñiga is the daughter of Berta Cáceres, an Indigenous Lenca environmental activist. In March 
2016, armed intruders killed Cáceres in her home. Prior to her murder, Cáceres had strongly 
opposed the construction of a hydroelectric dam in Lenca territory. The Honduran National 
Criminal Court later found that executives from Desarrollos Energéticos (DESA), the company 
constructing the dam, hired her murderers. (Frontline Defenders, 2018)!
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Hernández concludes his speech by drawing attention to the role that family, teachers, religious 
leaders, media, and organizations have in changing the culture of violence in Honduras. Once 
again, he fails to mention the role of the state in these transformations, instead placing the heaviest 
tasks on what he deems to be the pillars of society. In this statement, Hernández also clearly pushes 
Catholic values forward; he emphasizes that the heteronormative family—which as he states, 
consists of a mother and a father—and spiritual leaders make up a key part of the Honduran social 
fabric and can, therefore, re-shape culture. This is not, however, a unique incident. Hernández’s 
focus on reshaping culture comes up repeatedly in his discourse, as seen once again in a speech 
from a meeting on violence against women in August 2018: “We need to change a culture and that 
requires an aggressive communication program.” (Hernández, 2018 Aug. 17) Thus, it seems that 
Hernández understands violence against women as a cultural issue, perhaps one perpetuated by 
misogyny, machismo, or toxic masculinity. While he does not discuss the source of this cultural 
violence in his speech, he shifts the conversation away from the responsibility of institutions and 
the state in eradicating structural impunity in Honduras. These sentiments are also embedded in 
Honduran law; Article 9 of the Law of Equal Opportunities for Women (2000) states that “the 
family, as the first area of socialization, transmission and learning of identity models, behaviors, 
attitudes and values, must become a space for generating equal rights and opportunities for its 
members.” (República de Honduras, 2000) 
 Similar to that of former Guatemalan Vice President, Roxana Baldetti, and former First 
Lady, Hilda Patricia Marroquin de Morales, Hernández’s rhetoric reinforces stereotypes of women 
in the private sphere, emphasizing that they are “natural born” caretakers. At the Inauguration of 
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Ciudad Mujer23 in San Pedro Sula in November 2018, he said: “Thank you, women, for making 
life so pleasant, so happy, for being supportive, for also being patient, and now we are en route to 
changing Honduras.” (Hernández, 2018 Nov. 22) Just months earlier, at an event for Women in 
Construction, he claimed, “Now, the vast majority of women are heads of household, and if they 
are going to create this Honduras of opportunities, we must start with those sectors [in which 
women do not make up] the same proportion as men.” (Hernández, 2018 Dec. 6) In both of these 
statements, Hernández reinforces the stereotype that women are motherly caretakers in their 
households. On the one hand, he thanks women for being pleasant, happy, patient, and for being a 
support system to the people in their lives. He appreciates these women not for their 
social/economic/political contributions, but rather for the emotions they evoke and for what they 
can offer others. On the other hand, Hernández continuously speaks about women’s contributions 
within the context of the home. This rhetoric appears yet again in Hernández’s speech at the July 
2019 Inauguration of Ciudad Mujer in La Ceiba:  
The mother of the family, who are largely heads of household,24 play an important role in 
educating boys, girls, [solving] problems within the family because there is a lot of 
domestic violence, intrafamily violence . . . and that is a matter of principles and of values, 
of respecting each other, and that only happens at home, at school, at kindergarten, and 
Ciudad Mujer has to be an agent of change. (Hernández, 2019 July 17) 
 
For one thing, Hernández clearly praises women’s roles as mothers who are responsible for the 
socialization of their families. He places these responsibilities on the women themselves, claiming 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 In 2016, the Honduran government replicated El Salvador’s project of Ciudad Mujer. Similar to 
the Salvadoran version, Ciudad Mujer in Honduras is a network of government-funded centers that 
provide services to women in six areas: economic autonomy, sexual and reproductive health, 
protection of women’s rights, attention to adolescent girls, community education, and childcare. 
Ciudad Mujer has since expanded to five centers across Honduras. (Ciudad Mujer Honduras, 2020)  
!
24 In his speech, Hernández does not clarify what he means by women serving as “heads of [their] 
household.” Typically, being the head of one’s household implies that a woman is a single mother 
and is generating the income for that household, which, in turn, suggests that she is working in 
some capacity.!
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that they must “properly” solve family problems and educate their sons and daughters so that future 
generations, in turn, can change social patterns of domestic and intrafamily violence. Broadly 
speaking, he lifts this “burden” off of the state as he imposes the teaching of values of respect on 
women and on schools. Additionally, Hernández employs an individualistic explanation of 
domestic violence. He clearly portrays it as an issue in the private, and not the public, sphere. In 
this instance, he draws no connection between violence in the two spheres, which would, in part, 
require him to acknowledge how the state’s response to political dissenters and gangs has helped 
normalize domestic, intrafamily, and intimate partner violence. 
Interviews 
As mentioned in my methodological framework, I interviewed six representatives from 
women’s organizations in Guatemala, two from Costa Rica, and one (over the phone) from El 
Salvador. Engaging in dialogue with these administrators, who dedicate their life’s work to 
addressing gender-based violence and advancing the rights of women, taught me numerous things 
about how violence is understood in Central America. Topics that came up during interviews 
included patrimonial violence, religion, and political violence, all of which I will discuss here. 
Patrimonial and Economic Violence 
Several of the women I interviewed spoke about patrimonial violence, a concept that did 
not come up very often in my survey of the academic literature. Patrimonial violence is often 
equated with economic violence, which is defined as “acts that restrict women’s ability to generate 
or control their own income or support their families.” (Deere, Contreras, and Twyman, 2014, p. 
144) Deere et al. (2014), however, make conceptual distinctions between the terms, noting that 
patrimonial violence “focuses on violations of women’s property rights—their ability to own and 
manage the individual and joint property to which they are entitled.” (p. 144) Drawing from 
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feminist economic theory, Deere et al. emphasize the harmful effects of patrimonial violence and 
explain that asset ownership can enhance women’s “fallback” position, or how well off they would 
be if their marriage or relationship ended. (Agarwal, 1994, 1997; Deere and León, 2001; Katz, 
1991; p. 145) Though women with financial or property assets are more likely to have the means 
with which to support themselves and their family in case of divorce or separation, their risk to 
physical violence from a partner or spouse also increases. (Deere et al., 2014, p. 146)  
Though one of my informants spoke of patrimonial violence, her explanation more closely 
aligned with conceptualizations of economic violence, particularly with the notion of “women’s 
[restricted] ability to generate or control their own income.” (Deere et al., 2014, p. 144) Elena, an 
administrator from Asociación Ciudadana ACCEDER in Costa Rica, illustrated the effects of 
economic violence in the following example from her life:  
I am a survivor of violence, of various types of violence, now that I think about it, right? 
About my father, let’s say, at that time it was extremely difficult because my mother was 
50 years old, perhaps, and she had no profession. Also [my father] was an academic, right? 
In other words, for me the issue of patrimonial violence was very obvious, very palpable, 
and emotional violence, of course, too. Sometimes we forget that this is something else. 
We cannot live with violence permanently. 
 
Looking back, Elena notes that economic violence was not highly visible in her family, yet it was 
very present. Normative economic gender roles, which have historically set women up as 
homemakers and men as breadwinners, limited Elena’s mother’s ability to develop a profession, 
and therefore, generate and control her own income in the traditional sense. With this in mind, I 
recall former Guatemalan Vice President Roxana Baldetti’s discourse in which she frequently 
brings up the significance of a woman’s role in the family. Elena, in turn, provided a real life 
example of how these representations bore weight in her nuclear household: her father earned a 
prestigious position as an academic to maintain the family financially, while normative economic 
gender roles limited her mother’s prospects. Because she never established a career for herself, 
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Elena’s mother could not participate in the public labor force and exercise her economic autonomy 
in the public sphere.  
In another interview, Adela, a FLACSO-Guatemala affiliated faculty member, commented 
on the types of violence against women that Guatemala’s Law Against Femicide (2008) outlaws: 
“The femicide law here in Guatemala recognizes four types [of violence against women], which 
are physical violence (which is the most visible), psychological, sexual, and patrimonial or 
economic.” As Adela highlights, the Guatemalan Law Against Femicide and Other Forms of 
Violence Against Women (2008) places patrimonial and economic violence on the same plane. It 
broadens the definition to not only include the violation of a woman’s property rights, as Deere et 
al. (2014) posit, but also of all her economic rights, including the ability to freely participate in the 
public labor sector with financial compensation and without discrimination or judgment. The 
Honduran Law Against Domestic Violence (1997) also groups these two concepts together. While 
most legislation in Guatemala and Honduras leaves out patrimonial violence, two laws in El 
Salvador specifically criminalize it: the Law Against Intrafamily Violence (1996) recognizes 
psychological, physical, sexual, and patrimonial violence, while the Special Comprehensive Law 
for a Life Free of Violence for Women (2011) conceptually distinguishes economic (actions that 
limit, control, or prevent women’s economic survival) and patrimonial violence (actions that 
destroy, harm, limit, or retain objects, personal documents, valuables, and patrimonial rights). 
Religion 
 Discussions of women’s social roles also came up repeatedly throughout several 
interviews, especially in regard to religion. In Guatemala, approximately 58.2 percent of the 
population is Catholic and 35.6 percent is Protestant. (Pew Research Center, 2010a) In El Salvador, 
roughly 51.1 percent of the population is Catholic and 35.7 percent is Protestant. (Pew Research 
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Center, 2010b) In Honduras, about 50.3 percent of the population is Catholic and 36.6 percent is 
Protestant. (Pew Research Center, 2010c) As previously mentioned in my discourse analysis, 
political leaders, such as Guatemalan former president Jimmy Morales, have very openly 
integrated Christian values into their political platforms and discourse, condemning abortion and 
upholding a heteronormative nuclear family unit as the basis of society. In my interviews, several 
informants claimed religion perpetuates everyday violence in the lives of women. Isabel, an 
administrator from Fundación Sobrevivientes, made the important observation that religious 
principles create certain expectations of a woman’s behavior and also place them at risk of 
becoming trapped in abusive relationships:  
[Women] who have been educated to be subdued, that is, to be submissive, become much 
more vulnerable. They have been told not to raise their voice, they must do what they are 
told. The subject of tradition and, sometimes, the very traditional and closed-minded 
thoughts we can have. And here the subject of religion has been immersed, which weighs 
heavily when making the decision of whether to leave that circle of violence or stay. 
Especially the issue of religious marriage. In our countries, it is a very difficult thing for 
many women to break it off. 
 
In this excerpt from our interview, Isabel highlights the importance of religion in making or 
breaking cycles of violence. More specifically, she notes this within the bounds of marriage. On 
several occasions, the Bible condemns divorce and separation: “What therefore God has joined 
together, let not man separate.” (Mark 10:9, English Standard Version Bible) These religious 
principles, consequently, weigh heavily in many women’s decision to stay in abusive 
relationships.25  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25!In Guatemala, divorce has been legalized since at least 1963, when the country’s first Civil Code 
went into effect. It is, however, permissible only under certain conditions (see República de 
Guatemala, 1963). Article 154 of the 1963 Civil Code claims that separation and divorce may be 
declared by mutual agreement of spouses or by the will of one spouse through a determined cause.!
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Religion also contributes to constructions and expectations of women as obedient, dutiful 
wives. The Bible, for instance, sets up images of women who subject to their husbands: “Likewise, 
wives, be subject to your own husbands, so that even if some do not obey the word, they may be 
won without a word by the conduct of their wives, when they see your respectful and pure conduct 
. . . For this is how the holy women who hoped in God used to adorn themselves, by submitting to 
their own husbands.” (1 Peter 3:1-5) Isabel notes that in countries like Guatemala, where 
approximately 90 percent of the population practices a Christian-based faith, defying religious law 
poses social and religious consequences. Thus, religious doctrine plays a crucial role when women 
are faced with the decision of remaining in or leaving an abusive relationship. This is important to 
take note of within a greater context, especially looking at the role of the state. In the case of 
Guatemala, politicians like Jimmy Morales have vehemently integrated religious principles into 
their political platform. By openly endorsing these values in discourse, state representatives 
arguably pressure civil society to live in accordance with them. Anyone who does not act so is, 
therefore, deemed unworthy of God and the state’s protection.  
Religious principles also construct ideas of pain and suffering that, arguably, contribute to 
the naturalization and normalization of violence in everyday life. This became a talking point in 
my interview with María, an administrator in the Observatorio en Salud Sexual y Reproductiva in 
Guatemala City:  
There is a structure that tells you the woman is submissive; the woman must obey within 
religiosity. I mean, here I live in hell, but later when I die, I will go to heaven. Which is 
what many sell you. Here they offer you suffering, but in the afterlife, you will be happy. 
That accommodation, I would say, could even be a mental accommodation. In other words, 
the burden of suffering from violence and poverty is so great that you lose, as I understand 
it, you lose hope. And then you no longer see how your life goes day by day and, of course, 
you internalize and accept as reality that you cannot change the fact of violence. 
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The Bible speaks often about suffering, portraying it as a price to pay while we await to join God 
in Heaven. In one such case, the religious text says: “For I consider that the sufferings of this 
present time are not worth comparing with the glory that is to be revealed to us.” (Romans 8:18) 
In affirming that suffering is a natural and necessary part of life, Christian doctrine influences the 
ways in which women understand the situations of violence they find themselves in. María argues 
that it is these perceptions of suffering during our lifetime that encourage women to internalize the 
violence in their daily lives. Consequently, they run the risk of accepting that there is nothing they 
can do to stop violence. This is further propelled by the state itself, as politicians uphold a 
conservative agenda at the expense of the rights of women. 
Gloria, an administrator from Grupo Guatemalteco de Mujeres, also noted that religion, as 
a mechanism and institution, can lead to symbolic and direct violence: 
G: Religion also greatly affects and conditions women to accept such violence in their lives 
. . . There is a very strong Latin American current of religious fundamentalism that is tucked 
into the lives of women, and that is a serious obstacle for women in all territories because 
women have no self-determination over their right to fully exercise their human rights . . . 
Religions are putting at the center, or rather allowing, symbolic and direct violence. In the 
symbolic [sense], consider, recently, a priest from Costa Rica [who] pronounced the 
situation of rape of girls as if it is permissible. They are permissible to these situations but 
not to respect the integrity and decisions of women.26  
 
L: And direct violence? What would the connection be with religion? 
 
G: Well, there are pastors, priests, and hierarchical members of the Church who still abuse 
girls in performing their duty. They grope them, rape them, touch them, right? And since 
they are in confession, right, using the mechanism of the Church, they are told to shut up, 
to say nothing, or they will kill them. The rapists are telling them that. The one who should 
protect you—because they are supposed to be protective figures—is using male power and 
religious power to oppress women. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 At the time of our interview, it did not occur to me to ask Gloria for the Costa Rican priest’s 
name. However, after doing some brief research, I believe she may have been referring to Mauricio 
Antonio Viquez Lizano. Police captured and arrested him in Mexico just days before our interview. 
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Gloria claims that the Catholic Church generates direct and symbolic violence. To clarify her point, 
she highlights the many claims of sexual abuse that have emerged against religious figures across 
Latin America, noting the example of a priest from Costa Rica. As Gloria notes, how could these 
individuals be sexually or physically violent if they are members of the Church? Who will believe 
that a priest would go against God’s word and harm someone? Their purpose is to serve and protect 
the community through religious doctrine. Instead, however, they exploit their elevated social and 
moral status to commit these crimes. Their moral compass often goes unquestioned, placing their 
victims against the odds when they come forward with accusations. 
Political Violence 
Religion is also very much tied into electoral and political violence. Likely due to the fact 
that I arrived in Guatemala in the recent aftermath of a presidential election (in which one of the 
principal candidates was a woman), my interviewees had much to say about political violence and 
its effects on women. Mostly in the case of Guatemala, but also to a certain extent in Costa Rica, 
informants noted that female politicians are portrayed differently in the media, on social media, 
and in religious discourse. At the time of our interview in August 2019, Adela—a FLACSO-
Guatemala faculty member—shared with me a recently published newspaper column from 
Guatemala’s Nuestro Diario titled “¿Tendremos ‘presidenta’?” (Will we have a ‘female 
president’?), written by Arnulfo Chapas Pérez. In this column, Chapas Pérez writes the following 
about Sandra Torres, a female candidate representing the National Unity of Hope party in the 
August 2019 runoff presidential election: “If a woman were to govern us, it is our, the men’s, fault 
. . . That a woman assumes a presidential command is not natural, since morally, men cannot be 
under the order or ordering of a woman. The leadership was conferred by God on men and that 
principle is natural, it cannot be violated.” (Chapas Pérez, 2019 Aug. 5) Representations that depict 
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women as unfit to take on positions of public influence also come up in official discourse; 
politicians consistently emphasize and praise women’s social role within the family, further 
contributing to the naturalization of women’s roles in the private sphere (i.e. the household) and 
their stigmatization in the public realm. These portrayals, in turn, shed light on María’s argument 
that women internalize the conditions of their lives, such as poverty and violence, and therefore 
do not act on them in part due to social, political, and religious values that naturalize beliefs of 
women’s subordination and suffering. 
Questions of religion also surface when looking into the name-calling habits that emerged 
during the 2019 electoral campaign in Guatemala. Name-calling became a running gag on social 
media, appearing in Facebook posts and YouTube videos. While the public often called the 
winning candidate, Alejandro Giammattei, a liar, they also consistently labelled Sandra Torres a 
witch across different platforms. Witches are generally associated with evil and sorcery, both of 
which are strongly condemned in Judeo-Christian faiths. In proclaiming her a witch, Torres’ critics 
not only questioned her moral character within the political realm, but also in all spheres of life. 
During our interview, Gloria, from Grupo Guatemalteco de Mujeres, also noted that social media 
users criticized Torres for being perverse and evil, thus creating a stigma around women who 
transgress social roles dictated by Christian doctrine. The relevance of this to the greater picture, 
however, is that if women are not accepted and respected in the public sphere, how can laws 
designed to protect them truly be on their side?27 
Other topics that came up in most of my interviews include: structural violence, women’s 
sexual and reproductive rights, everyday violence, gangs, organized crime, and narco-trafficking, 
and historical legacies of state violence. In the following chapter, I situate these findings from my 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 I speak further about this in the Political Violence sub-section of my Discussion section. 
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interviews within the violence triangle (Galtung, 1969, 1990) and multisided violence (Menjívar, 
2008, 2011; Menjívar and Walsh, 2017; Walsh and Menjívar, 2016a) conceptual frameworks. 
CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION 
 In my survey of the literature on feminicide and other forms of gender-based violence in 
Central America, I grouped the readings by the following themes: cultural and symbolic violence, 
political and legal violence, and structural and economic violence (Galtung, 1969, 1990; Menjívar, 
2008, 2011). Reviewing the literature prompted me to understand that violence is a multisided 
issue, which involves direct (clearly recognizable) and invisibilized forms (Galtung, 1969, 1990; 
Scheper-Hughes, 1992, 1996; Bourgois, 2001; Bourdieu, 2004; Menjívar, 2008, 2011; Walsh and 
Menjívar, 2016a). In my discussion, I use two theoretical frameworks to respond to my research 
question: Galtung’s (1969, 1990) violence triangle and Menjívar’s (2008, 2011) multisided 
violence. (see also Walsh and Menjívar, 2016a, 2016b; Menjívar and Walsh, 2017) 
Galtung’s (1969, 1990) violence triangle framework understands violence as being 
composed of direct, structural, and cultural forces. The violence triangle dynamically explains how 
direct, structural, and cultural violence build off of one another, and how these shift (yet, also 
remain the same) depending on spatial-temporal contexts: 
When the triangle is stood on its ‘direct’ and ‘structural violence’ feet, the image invoked 
is cultural violence as the legitimizer of both. Standing the triangle on its ‘direct violence’ 
head yields the image of structural and cultural sources of direct violence. Of course, the 
triangle always remains a triangle – but the image produced is different, and all six 
positions (three pointing downward, three upward) invoke somewhat different stories, all 
worth telling. Despite the symmetries there is a basic difference in the time relation of the 
three concepts of violence. Direct violence is an event; structural violence is a process with 
ups and downs; cultural violence is an invariant, a ‘permanence’ remaining essentially the 
same for long periods . . . The three forms of violence enter time differently, somewhat like 
the difference in earthquake theory between the earthquake as an event, the movement of 
the tectonic plates as a process and the fault line as a more permanent condition. (Galtung, 
1990, p. 294) 
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The image of the violence triangle itself critically informs the dynamic and spatial-temporal 
complexity of Galtung’s theoretical approach to violence. In his groundbreaking work, Galtung 
coined the terms structural and cultural violence to shed light on the “invisible” violence in the 
lives of people that breed conditions for direct (more recognizable) forms. Galtung’s 
conceptualization of structural violence, and to a certain extent, cultural violence, constitute 
theoretical pillars in Menjívar’s (2008, 2011) multisided violence framework.28 
Menjívar (2008, 2011) inductively developed the multisided violence framework of 
analysis to examine the multifaceted character of this phenomenon and its expression in the 
quotidian lives of Ladina (non-Indigenous) women in eastern Guatemala. Similar to Galtung’s 
violence triangle, the multisided violence theoretical framework accounts for physical and 
observable violence, in addition to more “invisible,” everyday forms. Menjívar’s framework 
diverges from Galtung’s in that it employs numerous lenses to explore the multisided nature of 
violence, including structural violence, political violence and state terror, everyday violence, 
interpersonal violence, and crime, symbolic violence and the internalization of inequality, and 
gender and gendered violence. In their work on legal tolls and persistent impunity for feminicide 
in Guatemala, Walsh and Menjívar (2016b) adapt the multisided violence framework to also 
include legal violence. All of these lenses, in conjunction with one another, explore how structural 
and gender inequalities become internalized and often go undetected in everyday expressions of 
life, such as marital unions, motherhood, women’s work, and religion. I use Menjívar’s multisided 
theoretical framework to note, as Walsh and Menjívar (2016a) claim, how various forms of 
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28!Menjívar (2011) moves away from the concept of cultural violence because, she argues, it 
presents an individualistic account and understanding of violence. Instead, she uses Bourdieu’s 
concept of symbolic violence, which encapsulates—but also goes beyond—certain aspects of 
Galtung’s cultural violence.!
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violence influence the ways in which “individuals interpret the laws . . . how they view violence 
in the lives of women, [as well as] how women view themselves” and the conditions in which they 
live. (p. 588)  
Structural Violence 
A major pillar in Galtung’s violence triangle and Menjívar’s multisided violence 
frameworks, structural violence plays a crucial role in the implementation of policies on the ground 
in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. Structural violence, as Galtung argues, is often 
invisibilized and does not leave direct marks or inflict physical pain; yet, it is just as harmful as 
direct violence. In the context of policy in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, structural 
violence arguably impedes women’s access to systems of justice accorded to them under the law. 
Factors such as poverty, education, language, and geography can serve as barriers to women who 
wish to report crimes committed against them and/or inform themselves of the rights and 
protections granted to them under the law.  
The ways in which structural violence—or any other form of violence, for that matter—
affects Central American women may best be understood through an intersectional lens. 
(Crenshaw, 1991) Intersectional analyses of violence are perhaps better visualized as a “dreadful 
mosaic” (Speed, 2014, 2019), rather than as a continuum of violence (Kelly, 1987; Sev’er, 1999; 
Moser, 2001; Cockburn, 2004; Giles and Hyndman, 2004). As Speed (2014) notes, the continuum 
of violence “group[s] all women together and [does] not [account] for the ways that other aspects 
of women’s lives—their race, their class, their immigration or disability status—render them more 
vulnerable than other women.” (p. 2) On the other hand, Speed posits that visualizing gender 
violence as a dreadful mosaic has the “benefit of highlighting that each individual shard, like each 
form of oppression or violence, with its own sharp-edged and jagged contours, is always part of a 
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much larger social assemblage that defines it meaning.” (2014, p. 10) This re-conceptualization of 
the continuum conveys how different forms of violence and intersections of race, class, gender, 
age, and disability status interact at all times to constitute a greater picture. Arguably, structural 
violence further predisposes women of certain racial or class backgrounds to physical and 
symbolic forms of violence. Though laws have been created to prevent, sanction, and eradicate 
gender-based violence in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, most of them do not integrate an 
intersectional framework that acknowledges the ways in which race, class, or other vectors 
interfere with women’s access to justice. Lawmakers, Bellino (2010) argues, “[assume] that 
women have equal access to justice, though systems of corruption, discrimination, and poverty 
limit the level of engagement that a woman . . . can have with state institutions.” (p. 8–9) For 
instance, women trapped in conditions of poverty face additional barriers to education or economic 
autonomy, tools that would likely afford them greater access to and knowledge of the law and 
justice systems.  
Other structural barriers that women face include language and geography. In Guatemala, 
language is especially salient, as over 40% of the population identifies as Indigenous. (IWGIA, 
2019) Judicial systems in Guatemala rarely offer bilingual support, thus reinforcing ethno-racial 
hierarchies. Because most state institutions operate in Spanish, speakers of Indigenous languages 
often find themselves with little or no resources when it comes to seeking legal redress. In the best 
case scenario, they must rely on the state to find them a translator. Geographic factors are just as 
important when it comes to structural violence; impoverished women living in remote rural areas 
are likely required to go to greater lengths to report a crime than those in urban centers.29 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29!Because I did not travel to rural areas in Guatemala, El Salvador, or Honduras, I draw these 
conclusions from a qualitative study on the role of walking and waiting in the lives of women 
enrolled in a conditional cash transfer (CCT) program in rural areas of Peru. (Cookson, 2018) In 
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Impoverished women who live far from a police station or court must walk or commute long 
distances to report/prosecute their perpetrators, which may discourage them from doing so in the 
first place. In addition to walking, women also wait for, as Cookson (2018) notes, “attention from 
bureaucrats, and for politicians to fulfill promises.” (p. 76) Asking rural women to go far out of 
their way to report a crime or to access systems of social support and justice allows the state to 
control how women spend their time, contributing to “time poverty.” (Antonopoulos and Hirway, 
2010; Cookson, 2018) Women are thus expected to spend their own time (and money) if they wish 
to hold their perpetrator accountable in the courts, as their report purportedly poses an 
“inconvenience” to the system. Impoverished Indigenous, Afro-descended, and Afro-Indigenous 
women in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, therefore, face additional barriers to systems of 
support and justice than middle- or upper-class non-Indigenous women in urban areas.  
It is also essential to note that, as Sokoloff and Dupont (2005) argue and Speed (2014) 
reminds us, “gender inequality itself is modified by its intersection with other systems of power 
and oppression.” (p. 43; p. 6) This can be clearly observed in the lives of Indigenous K’iche, 
K’anjob’al, Mam, Q’eqchi, Ixil, Kaqchikel, and Chuj women who demanded reparations and 
justice for human rights violations that took place during the Guatemalan civil conflict. (Fulchirone 
et al., 2011) Though these women demanded legal redress, the state’s failure to fully prosecute 
those responsible for crimes against humanity posed a major barrier. In 2013, General Efraín Ríos 
Montt was put on trial for genocide and crimes against humanity; the courts found him guilty and 
sentenced him to eighty years in prison.!However, a Constitutional Court annulled the decision 
just ten days later on the grounds of “procedural irregularities.” (Sanford, Álvarez-Arenas, and 
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the case of Peru, many impoverished, Indigenous women must walk days on end to their district 
capital to present proof that they are meeting program conditions and to collect their CCT checks.!
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Dill, 2016) Drawing from this example, racialized and gendered hierarchies of power help drive 
systems of corruption and impunity. In turn, as Farmer (2004) claims, structures of inequality are 
sustained by the state’s complicity in erasing “history and cover[ing] up the clear links between 
the dead and near-dead and those who are the winners in the struggle for survival.” (p. 307) In 
post-war Guatemala, Indigenous women (and men) continue to experience structural, symbolic, 
and legal forms of violence that aim to discredit and erase their lived experiences and histories, 
and which further enable structures that are purportedly “nobody’s fault.” (Farmer, 2004, p. 307) 
The legal and judicial system is structured to support middle- or upper-class, European, Anglo-
American, and mestizo heterosexual, cisgender men, thus ostracizing and marginalizing racial and 
gendered “Others.” (Razack, 2000) Racial, class, and gender hierarchies are embedded in the social 
and institutional fabric in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, which ultimately affect the 
resources and pathways to justice that women have. I do not, however, wish to claim that poverty 
is a cause of violence; rather, it poses structural barriers to women attempting to gain equal access 
to systems of justice. This point came up in my interview with Marta and Paula, two administrators 
from CODEFEM, when I asked if they believe poverty affects the implementation of policies on 
gender-based violence: 
M: Poverty… 
P: Aggravates the lives of women, I think? 
M: Aggravates the lives of women and access to justice. That’s the problem. Because 
justice is centralized. 
P: Many people think that violence is related to alcohol and poverty. That is justifying 
violence. 
 
Thus, while poverty is not a cause of violence, Menjívar and Walsh (2017) argue that “it puts poor 
women at extreme risk for repeated victimization and at a disadvantage in exercising their 
citizenship rights.” (p. 224) 
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Structural, Economic, and Patrimonial Violence 
Economic, patrimonial, and structural violence also go hand in hand. While patrimonial 
violence, broadly speaking, is the “violation of women’s property rights,” Deere et al. (2014) 
highlight that economic violence consists of “acts that restrict women’s ability to generate or 
control their own income or support their families.” Drawing once again from my interview with 
Elena, —from Asociación Ciudadana ACCEDER in Costa Rica—her mother never developed a 
career, while her father was an esteemed academic scholar. Thus, while Elena’s father took on the 
role of economic head of household, her mother did not have the opportunity to develop a career 
and generate an income in the traditional sense. Normative gender expectations that emerge from 
patriarchal religions have helped dictate the spheres in which women are welcome and accepted, 
and in which ones they are not. This severely limits women’s ability to participate freely and 
without judgment in the public sector and in the political economy.  
On the other hand, for those women who have gone to work in the “public” sphere (as 
vendors, domestic employees, and operators in maquilas, for instance), globalization and 
neoliberalism have led to systemic trends of inequality that exploit women and their labor, hence 
contributing to the myth of the “disposable third world woman,” who is discarded and replaced 
once she becomes “industrial waste.” (Wright, 2006, p. 2) Though neoliberalism has arguably 
further opened up the public labor force for women, Walsh and Menjívar (2016a) claim it 
counterintuitively generates precarious work conditions, “limit[ing] women’s economic 
opportunities and mak[ing] them more vulnerable and dependent on their partners for survival.” 
(p. 589) In this context, it could be argued that neoliberal economic systems institute a hierarchy 
of patriarchal power that exploits women’s bodies as sources of cheap, disposable labor. To draw 
this back into conversation with the implementation of policies and women’s access to systems of 
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justice, neoliberalism commoditizes women’s bodies and places them at further risk of violence in 
the workplace and household. Ultimately, it has shifted the conversation away from the rights and 
compensation of workers, towards the maximization of profitability. These processes have, as 
Federici (2004) notes, required the “transformation of the body into a work-machine, and the 
subjugation of women to the reproduction of the work-force.” (p. 63) Corporations survive at the 
expense of their workers, violating women’s ability to freely and safely exercise their economic 
rights and autonomy. In the case of Honduras, the 2009 military coup d’état also had structural 
implications on women’s labor. Ronderos (2011) observed that many women who refused to 
support and march in favor of the de facto government lost their jobs as textile workers in maquilas, 
while those “working in the maquilas still operating after the global economic crisis [faced] longer 
hours to make up for the time lost during the protests.” (p. 321) State repression and violence also 
forced many street vendors out of work. 
Cultural and Symbolic Violence 
Questions of cultural and symbolic violence also appear in the violence triangle and 
multisided violence frameworks. Galtung (1990) uses the term “cultural violence,” which he 
defines as “those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence—exemplified by religion 
and ideology, language, and art, empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics)—that 
can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence.” (p. 291) Pierre Bourdieu’s concept 
of symbolic power and violence builds off of Galtung’s cultural violence, as it claims that “the 
dominated apply categories constructed from the point of view of the dominant to the relations of 
domination, thus making them appear as natural.” (2004, p. 229) Unlike physical or direct forms, 
symbolic violence can be difficult to identify and recognize due in part to its naturalization in the 
everyday lives of people. Bourdieu’s symbolic violence elucidates how structures of sociocultural 
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domination, such as gendered violence, are “‘product[s] of an incessant (and therefore historical) 
labour of reproduction’ to which singular agents . . . and institutions – families, the church, the 
educational system, the state – contribute.” (2004, p. 339) Symbolic violence takes shape in 
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras through political figures’ fixation on heteropatriarchal 
constructions of women’s social roles and the family unit. As Bourdieu notes, symbolic power is 
propelled by numerous sociopolitical actors working hand in hand, such as the church, state, 
educational system, and of course, family. Political figures in Guatemala, El Salvador, and 
Honduras have continuously spoken in favor of women’s roles within the family and condemned 
those who step outside these boundaries. Take, for instance, former Guatemalan President Jimmy 
Morales, who condemned abortion by saying that he will always be in favor of life, family, and 
marriage, or Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández who emphasized the important role of 
women in educating their children and solving problems within the family.30  
Symbolic violence comes into play in the representation of crimes against women as 
“crimes of passion” or “products of jealousy” in official discourse, as seen when Salvadoran 
President Nayib Bukele labelled the murder of Keni Guadalupe Larios a “feminicide of passion” 
in a July 2019 Tweet. These representations are highly dismissive of the magnitude of these crimes 
and naturalize them as part of everyday life. They also help shape the narrative that a woman must 
have done something wrong, offensive, or harmful to prompt her partner to react with such rage. 
Lastly, “crimes of passion” suggest that an aggressor committed the crime because of a personal, 
rather than a public, problem. This, in turn, relegates the crime away from being a public safety 
concern that the state must address, investigate, and respond to. These representations also 
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30!Hernández’s original words are: “The mother of the family, who are largely heads of household, 
play an important role in educating boys and girls, to solve problems within the family because 
there is a lot of domestic violence, intrafamily violence.” 
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illustrate how politics and religion build off of one another to push forward normative gender 
expectations that deem dutiful mothers and wives the most righteous and “worthy” women. In 
turn, women who step outside of those boundaries must be, as Bellino (2010) claims, “put back in 
their (domestic) place.” In Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, women’s corpses not only 
frequently show evidence of rape, but also of over-kill, which Carey and Torres (2010) affirm is 
“murder and torture that exceeds the force necessary to terminate life.” (p. 156) Women’s bodies 
often bear gruesome and excessive signs of torture, such as mutilation and dismemberment. In 
Honduras, Kennedy (2005) notes that the naked and tortured bodies of women have been found 
with “their legs open as a demonstration of male power.” (Prieto-Carrón et al., 2007, p. 26) These 
patterns of over-kill suggest that women are punished more forcefully for deviating from gender 
boundaries than men because, Carey and Torres (2010) argue, the “moral costs of defilement [are] 
greater.” (p. 157) 
Normative Gender Social Roles 
Women’s social roles in the family and in Guatemalan, Salvadoran, and Honduran society 
came up time and time again in interviews, as well. Paula, an administrator in CODEFEM in 
Guatemala City, notes that women’s social roles are a “common thread” in violence: “Violence 
has a common thread. And that [common thread] is how women are viewed. In other words, they 
have given us the role of the family, the role that we are going to grow, get married, have children, 
and take care of them. And they don’t see us in another role.” Paula observes that the way in which 
Guatemalan society constructs women’s social roles as obedient wives and mothers helps justify 
acts of violence against those who overstep these bounds. Yet, just as these social roles contribute 
to cycles of violence against women, one could argue that acts of violence also help reinforce 
women’s gender roles. Processes of gendered violence, Menjívar and Walsh (2017) note, 
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“reinforce and normalize expectations of gendered behavior . . . [their] imprint can be seen in the 
routinized daily acts of control, humiliations, and stigmatization of women and their bodies.” (p. 
224–225) This becomes especially salient when redirecting our thoughts back to discussions of 
economic and patrimonial violence, which I argue are subcategories of both structural and 
symbolic violence. Restricting women’s right to property—as Deere et al. (2014) posit—and 
economic autonomy depend on women to conform to certain subordinate social roles. Connections 
between symbolic violence and economic violence can be, once again, clearly seen in Elena’s, 
from Asociación Ciudadana ACCEDER in Costa Rica, example of her mother never developing a 
career for herself and her father becoming an established academic scholar. Though the reasons 
for this are manifold, they can likely be traced back to the social roles that Elena’s mother and 
father were expected to fill in their family as homemaker and breadwinner, respectively. Thus, 
economic violence links to symbolic violence because it builds off of the “natural” social roles 
that women are expected to take on: mother, wife, homemaker, and caretaker.  
Symbolic and structural violence also go hand in hand. Drawing from a stratified sample 
of 800 people in San Salvador in 1980, Martín-Baró observed that Salvadorans who identify as 
religious and have fewer years of schooling are more likely to hold rather “conservative” images 
of women, the family and the social order. (2016, p. 234)31 Drawing from Stevens’ concept of 
marianismo (1973), Martín-Baró develops the term hembrismo, to encapsulate the following 
“conservative” ideologies: a) family confinement (the woman is for the home), b) pre-matrimonial 
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31 Ignacio Martín-Baró was a Spanish Jesuit priest, philosopher, and scholar. In 1989, Salvadoran 
Armed Forces assassinated him in his residence at the José Simeón Cañas Universidad de 
Centroamérica (UCA) in San Salvador. Five other Jesuit priests (Armando López Quintana, 
Ignacio Ellacuría, Segundo Montes Mozo, Joaquin López y López and Juan Ramón Moreno Pardo) 
also died in the massacre, as well as a cook at the residence, Julia Elba Ramos, and her teenage 
daughter, Celina Mariceth Ramos. 
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virginity, c) fidelity and total submission to men, d) great sweetness and devotion, and e) traditional 
morality and religiosity.32 (2016, p. 238) In his survey, Martín-Baró finds that respondents with 
secondary and university levels of education identified as less religious than those with primary 
levels. (2016, p. 247) Consequently, most respondents with higher levels of education did not agree 
with the values underlined in hembrismo, while those with primary levels (or less) agreed more 
frequently. Thus, Martín-Baró’s study helps clarify the ways in which structural and symbolic 
violence often overlap: structural conditions pose barriers to working class people in gaining 
access to education, which in turn helps contribute to their internalization of the religious status 
quo.33 
Religion, Politics, and Women’s Reproductive Rights 
Religion and its influence on social constructions of women’s roles have also contributed 
to the stigmatization and control of women’s bodies, as evidenced by political attitudes toward 
abortion in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. Both El Salvador and Honduras currently have 
absolute bans on abortion and emergency contraception, including in cases of rape, incest, or when 
the mother’s life is at risk. (Center for Reproductive Rights, 2016) Originally adopted in 1983 and 
amended in 2008, the Honduran Penal Code criminalizes abortion, defining it as the death of a 
human being at any stage of pregnancy or during childbirth.34 It delineates punishments for those 
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32 I place the term “conservative” in quotation marks because this is the term that Martín-Baró uses 
in his study. 
 
33 See section on Everyday Violence for more on the internalization of socio-economic-political-
symbolic conditions. 
 
34 The original Honduran Penal Code of 1983 did not absolutely ban abortion. Article 131 allowed 
abortions performed by a doctor with the consent of the woman under the following circumstances: 
if the woman’s life was in danger/the woman’s health was seriously threatened by the pregnancy 
process or if the fetus was potentially “defective.” (República de Honduras, 1983) Abortion was 
later absolutely banned in 1985, when Decree 13-85 repealed Article 131. 
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who intentionally cause an abortion, such as: 3 to 6 years of prison if a woman consents to it, 6 to 
8 years if an agent does the procedure without the mother’s consent and without violence or 
intimidation, and 8 to 10 years if an agent does the procedure with violence, intimidation, and/or 
deception. (Poder Judicial de Honduras, 2008) The Honduran Congress refused to amend the total 
abortion ban when adopting a new Penal Code in 2017, thus allowing for the continued 
criminalization of abortion under any and all circumstances. (Center for Reproductive Rights, 
2017) In El Salvador, Articles 133–137 of the 1998 Penal Code criminalize abortions done with 
consent and/or by the woman herself (punishable by 2 to 8 years in prison), abortions done without 
consent (punishable by 4 to 10 years), aggravated abortion (done by a doctor, pharmacist, or other 
medical professional and punishable by 6 to 12 years), induced or assisted abortion (5 years), and 
negligent abortion (6 months to 2 years).35 (Center for Reproductive Rights, 2020a) Articles 133–
140 of the Guatemalan Penal Code, originally adopted in 1973, are somewhat laxer than those of 
El Salvador and Honduras. (República de Guatemala, 1973) I use the term lax, however, with 
caution. Since the Penal Code of 1973, all forms of abortion have remained punishable by law in 
Guatemala, with the exceptions of negligent abortions and therapeutic abortions, which would 
constitute a procedure done for the “sole purpose of preventing duly established danger to the life 
of the mother after exhausting all scientific and technical means.” (Center for Reproductive Rights, 
2020b; emphasis added) 
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35 Abortion has been criminalized in El Salvador since its first Penal Code of 1826. However, for 
the first time in Salvadoran legislation, the Penal Code of 1973 de-criminalized abortion in the 
following cases: if the woman’s life was in danger and abortion was the only means to save her 
life, if the pregnancy was a consequence of rape or statutory rape, or if it was detected that the 
fetus had a serious malformation or congenital disorder. Abortion was, once again, absolutely 
banned with the adoption of the Penal Code of 1998. (Guardado, 2014) 
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Political banter in El Salvador has historically condemned abortion for breaking the laws 
of God and the family unit. In fact, these have been key campaign strategies for political candidates 
from the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA), a right-wing conservative political party, 
against candidates from the left-wing Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) party. 
Prior to the victory of FMLN candidate Mauricio Funes in 2009, ARENA candidates claimed the 
FMLN’s socialist agenda entailed the “destruction of the family unit . . . [and] would legalize the 
slaughter of innocent unborn children, which is clearly against the laws of the Catholic Church, 
God, and Salvadoran values.” (ARENA, 2004; Viterna, 2012, p. 252) This political rhetoric not 
only sets up the heteropatriarchal family unit as the foundation of society, but it also indicates that 
Salvadoran national values are one and the same with those of the Catholic Church. Biroli and 
Caminotti (2020) highlight these patterns, as they note how conservative and right-wing political 
strategies in Latin America have rallied against “gender ideology,” setting it up as a threat to the 
family, children, marriage, the “natural order,” and national values. (p. 3) These themes also 
became relevant during my interview with Marta, an administrator from CODEFEM, who said:  
Religion has affected all parts [of Guatemala]. That is why it is understood that women are 
guilty. Political discourse has criminalized gender theory. To deputies, presidency, that was 
all the discourse. Gender theory is pro-abortion, dismantling families, being promiscuous, 
lesbians. They tie in the religious issue with the fundamentalists of the United States. 
Misogyny, xenophobia, and racism continue to be fomented.  
 
The ecclesiastical connection between the Church and State in El Salvador, in turn, exerts symbolic 
and direct violence on the bodies of women. It is symbolic in that the Catholic State upholds and 
praises women who satisfy certain religious social roles, such as obedient wives and dutiful 
mothers. Any woman who transgresses this role by having an abortion goes against the Church 
and the state’s values and is therefore, as Marta exemplified, a home wrecker, promiscuous, and/or 
a lesbian. This once again brings me to the concept of marianismo (Stevens, 1973); women who 
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conform to the social norm are deemed pure, honest, and virginal, while those who “overstep their 
boundaries” are evil, vile, and ruthless whores. At the same time, the total abortion ban in El 
Salvador and Honduras (and to a certain extent, the partial ban in Guatemala) exerts direct violence 
on the bodies of women, forcing them to endure life-threatening pregnancies or painful 
complications from illegal home abortions. In El Salvador, Viterna (2012) observes, abortion laws 
have been “enforced so strictly that public hospital doctors refuse to operate on women who have 
ectopic pregnancies until they can confirm that the embryo has no heartbeat, or until the woman’s 
fallopian tubes explode.” (p. 252) 
Direct and State Violence 
Galtung defines violence as the “cause of the difference between the potential and the 
actual, between what could have been and what is,” illustrating his argument with the following 
example: If a patient died of tuberculosis in the eighteenth century, it would not be considered 
violence because it was unavoidable at the time. If a patient died of the same disease in the present 
day, despite all of the medical resources that exist, this could be considered violence. (1969, p. 
168) Thus, when the actual is unavoidable, it is not considered violence; yet, “when the potential 
is higher than the actual is by definition avoidable and when it is avoidable, then violence is 
present.” (Galtung, 1969, p. 169) Galtung’s conceptualization of violence becomes salient in his 
definition of direct violence: “when a war is fought there is direct violence since killing or hurting 
a person certainly puts his ‘actual somatic realization’ below his ‘potential somatic realization’” 
(1969, p. 169).  
Following an analysis of the data I collected through interviews, I observed that discussions 
of direct violence came up most prominently in relation to violence exercised at the hands of the 
state. In Guatemala, the thirty-six-year long internal armed conflict inevitably became part of the 
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conversation on violence against women. When I asked if she saw any connections between 
violence against women in the past three decades and in the present day, Marta from CODEFEM 
said the following:  
L: Do you see connections between feminicides 20,30 years ago and feminicides today? 
M: Oh no, those are very different things. 
L: Yes, but do you see any connections? Not that they are the same, but that there are 
systems that have been maintained for a long time and that have allowed feminicide and 
violence against women? 
M: Oh, well, it continues to strengthen the hatred of women. Also [the notion of women] 
as spoils of war. Rape… Rape… Rape… 
L: Was very systematic?  
M: It was systematic and it still is.  
 
Marta notes that feminicides committed in the past and present are very distinct, invoking the 
notion that women became “spoils of war” during the civil conflict. As Menjívar (2018) argues, 
though “conditions of violence then and now are similar, they arise from different configurations 
of power and actors; today, new actors, such as organized criminal networks and gangs, play a 
central role.” Differences can also be observed in the motives for these crimes. As I will discuss 
shortly, during the civil conflict, the Guatemalan state systematically targeted Indigenous women 
for their reproductive ability to give life to future guerillas. Today, women are, in large part, 
targeted for what seems to be quite the opposite: failing to conform to normative gender 
expectations as obedient, virtuous wives and mothers.  
Sexual violence and torture against women (and men) became tactics of repression during 
the Guatemalan internal armed conflict. Sanford (2008) argues these tools have also become 
characteristic of feminicide in the present. Women’s bodies, therefore, transformed into important 
sites of war starting with the civil conflict (Ertürk, 2009). This “new type of war” is based on the 
systematic elimination of a “human type,” which anthropologist Rita Laura Segato terms 
femigenocide:  
! 69 
Gender aggressions in the new types of war, trafficking of persons reduced to conditions 
of concentration, and the abandonment and undernutrition of girls and female babies in 
Asian countries, among others. These types of feminicides . . . are similar in their 
dimensions to the category ‘genocide’ for their aggressions against women with the intent 
of lethality and physical deterioration in contexts of impersonality . . . victims are also 
victims because they belong to a social collective, in this case, gender. (2014, p. 365) 
 
Segato argues that women are systematically targeted through lethal acts of femigenocide that 
cause physical deterioration and harm to their bodies, in part, because they belong to a gendered 
social collective. In the case of the civil conflict, she notes that the Guatemalan state disintegrated 
community solidarity and the social fabric by subjecting Indigenous Maya women to systematic 
rape that stigmatized their bodies. (2014, p. 348) The state justified these acts, Sanford et al. (2016) 
note, by casting Maya women as “enemy ‘property’ deserving cruel destruction.” (p. 40) The 
government thus classified women as enemies of the state and targeted them with sexual violence 
to undermine their biological and socioeconomic reproductive capabilities. Using mutilation, rape, 
and murder, counterinsurgents ensured that women could not become mothers to “future 
guerillas.”36 Sexual violence was, therefore, used to destabilize the reproductive capacities of 
women, as evidenced by the testimony of a 57-year-old Indigenous woman survivor in 
Chicabracán: “A soldier barged into my house. At that time I was pregnant with my son. He abused 
me. As a result of the rape my child was born handicapped.” (Villanueva, 2019) Another survivor, 
69-year-old María, testified that she and her children hid in the mountains to escape routine state 
violence. Because they had little food while in hiding, María lost her two children. (Villanueva, 
2019) Though soldiers did not explicitly kill María’s family, the structural conditions they were 
pushed into—undernourishment and extreme poverty—ultimately took the lives of her children. 
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36 These sentiments were not unique to Guatemala; in El Salvador, Stephen (1995) argues, 
Indigenous communities “had one identity [to the military, various security police units, and many 
branches of the state]—that of subversives who were a threat to national security and to the 
capitalist modernization process.” (p. 808) 
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Given these extreme forms of repression, women could not exercise economic sovereignty, 
perform domestic work, and/or reproduce, thus diminishing the “enemy’s” capacity to survive.  
Additionally, Goett (2017) claims that the systematic use of sexual violence “signals a 
colonial logic that eroticizes military occupation and political domination . . . racial and sexual 
advantage fuels a ‘cult of imperial masculinity’ in which hierarchy feels sexually satisfying and 
politically empowering for occupying forces.” (p. 164–166) The eroticization of military 
occupation highlights how soldiers used acts of sexual violence to reaffirm gender, race, and class 
hierarchies. By imposing their “sexual advantage” on women, military soldiers asserted their 
gender and racial superiority over the “inferior” women they sexually abused and/or murdered. 
This builds off of, as Goett (2017) states, a “colonial logic” in which infringing the bodily 
autonomy of racial and gendered “Others” (Razack, 2000) reinforces the dominance of the 
colonizer and inferiority of the colonized. The violence exercised against women during the 
Guatemalan internal armed conflict and through historical processes of settler colonialism, 
however, is not merely a relic of the past. As Sanford (2008) claims, it continues to affect 
feminicide and sexual violence against women today.  
 The Honduran state also practiced sexual violence against women during and following 
the 2009 military coup d’état.37 Menjívar and Walsh (2017) assert this point as they draw on a 
qualitative study that Gervais and Estévez (2011) conducted at a community education center in 
north central Honduras; this study featured women’s testimonies of sexual and direct violence 
against social activists: “Post-coup related sexual assaults . . . included groping and beatings of 
breasts and vaginas, threats of sexual violence, intimidation tactics with explicit sexist insults, as 
well as gang rapes by soldiers and police during post-protest detentions, curfew sweeps and night 
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37 See Historical Context in Introduction for background on the 2009 coup d’état in Honduras. 
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raids in homes.” (p. 235; p.10–11) In the case of Honduras, military soldiers and law enforcement 
officers practiced sexual violence against dissenters to reinforce gender hierarchies. For one thing, 
state and military officials imposed their gender and “sexual advantage” on female activists, 
eroticizing processes of sociopolitical change so as to make them, as Goett (2017) writes, “sexually 
satisfying and politically empowering” for the heteropatriarchal state and its elites. Additionally, 
targeting women’s breasts and vaginas—body parts historically associated with the female body—
reduces dissenters to sexual and reproductive beings who do not belong in the public sphere; 
consequently, they must be put “back in their (domestic) place” because they stepped outside of 
their bounds. (Bellino, 2010) Thus, by exerting sexual violence and targeting women’s sexual and 
reproductive organs, Honduran state officials not only inflict direct and physical harm on women’s 
bodies, but they also impose symbolic and structural violence. The justification for these state 
crimes, in turn, likely becomes that these female dissenters are promiscuous and vile, and therefore 
deserve to be punished. Here, women are once again relegated as whores in the virgin-whore 
dichotomy or marianismo. (Stevens, 1973)  
Though in distinct sociohistorical contexts, the Guatemalan and Honduran states targeted 
women’s reproductive and sexual capacities with violence in an act of bio-power, which Foucault 
(1978) defines as the “subjugation of bodies and the control of populations.” (p. 140) To situate 
the deliberate attacks on women’s bodies in Guatemala and Honduras within Foucault’s 
framework, I argue that processes of nation-state building have exerted sexual violence as a form 
of bio-power to destabilize and dismantle the sexual and reproductive capacities of women (and 
men) who do not follow the so-called “status quo.” During the Guatemalan armed conflict, the 
state justified these principles with the ideology that Maya women would become mothers to future 
guerillas. (Speed, 2019, p. 38; Velásquez Nimatuj, 2016, p. 4) In post-coup Honduras, the state 
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deemed female activists a threat to the “natural order,” as their reproductive capacities would allow 
them to bring in the next generation of political dissenters. Thus, in order to contain women’s 
reproductive abilities, the new government responded with widespread violence under the guise 
of nation-state building. 
Everyday Violence 
 A concept originally developed by medical anthropologist Nancy Scheper-Hughes (1992, 
1996), everyday violence consists of daily practices and expressions of violence that, Bourgois 
(2001) claims, result “from the internalization of historically entrenched structural violence.” (p. 
7) It manifests itself in the micro-interactions of daily life, namely through interpersonal 
aggression and “common crime,” such as gang violence. (Bourgois, 2001) Perhaps everyday 
violence is best understood as an intersection of several other forms, such as structural, symbolic, 
and state. Those experiencing everyday violence have likely so internalized their daily conditions 
that they fail to recognize them as violent acts produced by greater socio-economic-political 
structures. In turn, the violence that takes place in the everyday lives of people, such as intrafamily 
violence and “common crime,” is normalized and unquestioned.  
 Official discourse in El Salvador contributes to the normalization of these everyday forms 
of violence. Here, I briefly return to discuss how labelling violence against women as “crimes of 
passion” or products of jealousy reduces these crimes to intimate acts within the private realm. 
Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele’s July 2019 Tweet, in which he labels the murder of 35-year-
old Keni Guadalupe Larios a “feminicide of passion,” presents the act of violence as a personal 
issue, implying that it is unworthy of further state investigation. Depicting crimes against women 
as products of passion or jealousy depoliticizes domestic, intrafamily, and intimate partner 
violence, as it suggests that jealousy and “passion” are natural in a romantic or intimate 
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relationship, and therefore, draw no connection to violence in the “public” sphere. 
Neoliberal Multicriminalism 
Everyday violence and gang violence, narco-violence, militarization, and state violence— 
all of which Speed (2016) associates with neoliberal multicriminalism38—are also closely woven 
in together in the Guatemalan, Salvadoran, and Honduran social fabric. (Bourgois, 2001; Sanford, 
2008; Speed, 2014, 2016; Walsh and Menjívar, 2016a) I took note of the ways in which the 
violence of neoliberal multicriminalism perpetuates and normalizes cycles of intrafamily violence 
and “common crime” in my interview with Isabel, an administrator from Fundación Sobrevivientes 
in Guatemala City, when I asked her how violence against women is broadly understood in 
Guatemalan society: 
Yes, look, regretfully [violence] is the use of power over another person. This is how 
violence is used in our country, regardless of whether you are a man or a woman. And we 
grew up during the internal armed conflict—that is, 36 years of conflict—where violence 
was used by both sides. And each one appealed that it was the truth and they justified 
themselves in all kinds of actions before their truth. And within this, we were born, we 
grew up within a circle of violence that moves from generation to generation. So what does 
this do? It creates situations of violence that today we see as so normal and we always have 
a justification. They killed her? She was involved in something. It is the same discourse 
that was used during the armed conflict. So whoever appeared dead had messed with the 
communists, right? 
 
Isabel highlights the discursive and material practices of violence that evolved during the internal 
armed conflict in Guatemala, and how these have persisted into the present day. During the civil 
conflict, she notes, the state punished people for taking part in something they should not have 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 Speed (2016) develops the term neoliberal multicriminalism in response to the failed promises 
of neoliberal multiculturalism in the 1990s, which was designed to bring neoliberal economic 
reform, democracy, and rule of law to Latin America. Neoliberal multicriminalism, according to 
Speed, encapsulates “all the damage of unrestrained neoliberal economic remains . . . illegal 
economies on a massive scale, and states simultaneously moving toward authoritarian governance 
and militarizing to combat illegality [and criminality] while corruptly participating in it to reap 
some of the profits.” (2016, p. 15) 
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been involved in, such as sympathizing with communist ideologies. These justifications allowed 
state officials and military officers to commit widespread acts of sexual violence, torture, and 
murder under the guise of “destroying communists” and fighting for the “greater good.” (Black, 
Jamail, and Chinchilla, 1984, p. 11) In El Salvador, similar sentiments arose during and after La 
Matanza.39 In the years following La Matanza, Hume (2008) argues, the Salvadoran military 
remained present and permeated everyday life with the “indiscriminate use of violence” and 
repression, which became even more manifest during the Salvadoran armed conflict as 
“perpetrators of violence were not only invisible death squads and uniformed combatants but 
neighbors, family members, and friends.” (p. 70)  
Violent, repressive responses from the state (such as mass-scale sexual violence and death 
squads) in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras have, as Hume (2008) notes, “shape[d] and 
transform[ed] what is considered ordinary, increasing people’s thresholds for tolerating violence 
and dictating their responses.” (p. 70) Isabel, from Fundación Sobrevivientes, drew attention to 
this notion in our interview. She reflected on how the Guatemalan internal armed conflict affected 
“people’s thresholds for tolerating violence,” as children and young adults grew accustomed and 
desensitized to seeing violence as an everyday solution to problems. These sentiments, she claims, 
are echoed in Guatemala’s youth today: 
With so many acts of violence that occur daily, the first to be on the scenes are children 
from the age of 10, even 2 years. Already seeing those scenes. And then they listen to the 
gunshots and instead of hiding, the children run out to see the dead person, right? If there 
is more blood than the day before, right? So what does this do? It normalizes, it flattens 
emotions because it no longer disturbs you. You no longer develop that emotion of 
thinking, well, poor person, maybe they had a family, right? Feelings of sympathy, 
empathy. Then that child grows, so in a violent situation, instead of responding to protect, 
they will let it happen because they already see it as normal. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 See Historical Context in Introduction for background on La Matanza. 
! 75 
Thus, the normalization of violence during periods of civil conflict in Guatemala, as well as in El 
Salvador and Honduras, has become manifest in everyday forms of violence. These cycles, 
Menjívar (2008) claims, demonstrate the “extent to which violence begets more violence, and how 
it is created and recreated in different spheres of life.” (p. 133) Therefore, to better understand the 
naturalization of intrafamily violence and “common crime” in Guatemala, El Salvador, and 
Honduras, it is crucial to unpack histories of state violence. 
“Private” Violence and Statewide Impunity 
To bring these analyses back into conversation with the implementation of policies in 
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, the widespread use of violence at the hands of the state 
naturalizes these actions as a response to “personal” problems, particularly intrafamily violence. 
In failing to acknowledge these connections, political discourse relegates intrafamily violence to 
the “private” or “personal” sphere, in which the state presumably has no business investigating or 
prosecuting perpetrators. Due in part to these perceptions, policies designed to address gender-
based forms of violence are overwhelmingly met with impunity, which then further normalizes 
these crimes by minimizing their magnitude. This becomes salient when drawing historical context 
into conversation: In the case of Guatemala, most perpetrators of war crimes were never held 
accountable for their actions. (CJA, 2018) Additionally, when the 1996 Peace Accords established 
a new Guatemalan National Civilian Police (PNC), the institution “recycled” thousands of agents 
from the former National Police with minimal training and preparation. Therefore, the “reformed” 
system directly absorbed remnants of the armed conflict. (Méndez Gutiérrez, 2013) “Recycling” 
has contributed to widespread impunity for perpetrators of crimes committed during the armed 
conflict which, in turn, has translated into the present day for aggressors in crimes against women. 
(Hume, 2008; Menjívar, 2008; Sanford, 2008; Velasco, 2008; Bellino, 2010; Ronderos, 2011; 
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Ramisetty and Muriu, 2013; Musalo and Bookey, 2014) 
The implementation of policies is also affected by the internalization of these everyday 
forms of violence. Processes of walking and waiting (Cookson, 2018) pose structural challenges 
to women who wish to report incidents of violence to law enforcement. Additionally, structural 
impunity has virtually ensured that perpetrators will not be held responsible. Consequently, fear 
of retaliation is often a concern for those wishing to report crimes. Specific to everyday violence, 
many women may also not report instances of violence in their day-to-day life because they have 
internalized these conditions and thus do not recognize them as violence; they endure their 
suffering because that is the way things are. (Menjívar, 2011) In several of my interviews, such as 
with Marta from CODEFEM, themes of religion came up once again in relation to women 
internalizing the conditions of their lives: 
L: Many women internalize the conditions in which they have lived, such as poverty or 
daily violence, and they think they must endure it because that’s the way things are… 
M: That’s how God wants it! 
L: Have you seen examples of this? 
M: Ooooh!!! [Laughs] That is the most common, let’s say. And now, even here in the city, 
and even more so in rural areas, they believe it is God’s will. In other words, religion has 
contributed so much to this martyrdom of women. It is God’s will. 
 
Marta’s example helps explain how symbolic violence manifests itself in cycles of everyday 
violence. Additionally, in cases where women do recognize this violence and choose to report, the 
individuals who make up the structures in place, such as law enforcement and judicial institutions, 
have likely internalized these forms of violence as part of “the way things are” and therefore do 
not deem these cases as worthy of further investigation or prosecution. This is precisely why 
“recycling” law enforcement agents who served during the internal armed conflict has been 
harmful; these agents, and their successors, have so deeply internalized the routine use of violence 
to “solve problems” that they continue to view it as a natural response in the present day. 
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Therefore, as Das (2007) observes, state violence “attaches itself with its tentacles into everyday 
life and folds itself into the recesses of the ordinary.” (p. 1) 
Political Violence 
 Though the terms political and state violence are sometimes used interchangeably, I draw 
distinctions between the two in an effort to integrate my informants’ insights. During interviews, 
I noticed a pattern when I asked about the direct and indirect effects of political violence in the 
lives of women. Rather than diving into discussions of state terror as I expected, some of their 
responses revolved around the challenges that women face in politics. In the context of my 
interviews, therefore, I interpret political violence to be a form of gendered, structural, and 
symbolic violence exercised against women in the political sphere. On the other hand, I define 
state violence as state terror: gendered, structural, symbolic, and direct violence (which includes 
sexual violence, disappearances, massacres, and murders) committed at the hands of the state to 
attain a political and/or economic goal.  
In the context of my interviewees’ insights, political, symbolic, and gendered violence 
share conceptual overlaps. Walsh and Menjívar (2016a) draw from Araque and Ospina Vélez 
(2008) to argue that “gender ideologies create spheres of social action that not only contribute to 
normalizing expressions of violence but also to justifying ‘punishments’ for deviations from 
normative gender role expectations.” (p. 593) This interpretation recalls notions of symbolic 
violence with a gendered lens and it came up in several of my interviews. As previously mentioned, 
I arrived in Guatemala in the recent aftermath of a presidential election, in which Alejandro 
Giammattei, of the right-wing Vamos political party, defeated Sandra Torres, from the left-wing 
National Unity of Hope party. Likely due to the proximity of my visit to a national election, most 
of my informants in Guatemala had significant insights into the political process and its treatment 
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of women. Several, for instance, spoke about the barriers female political figures and candidates 
face, especially the gendered ways in which they are criticized by the public. Isabel, an 
administrator from Fundación Sobrevivientes, claimed that women’s political participation is 
affected by structural and symbolic factors: 
L: Do you believe that political violence still exists? Does it affect women in Guatemala  
directly or indirectly? 
I: Well, yes, it affects us both [ways]. One, the difficulty of participating in political spaces 
during electoral contests. An example is that today in the new cabinet of the president, 
there is only one [female] minister, who I think will be more of a secretary. And the rest 
are men, right? The issue of even being able to participate under the same conditions 
becomes difficult because you must have financial resources and time. If they give you 
spaces to go as a candidate and a deputy, these are not from the upper echelons, but rather 
are almost the last or the intermediates ones where the possibilities of entering with small 
parties are almost nil. And those who top the first lists are men. So there you see that it is 
still much more difficult for women to participate. The other is the ways in which they are 
attacked. If a woman is dressed a certain way at a meeting, why? How indecent . . . Even 
the private aspects are attacked. She is ugly, she has fake breasts . . . A man is not 
questioned for this and the attacks sound different. They call him a thief, a swindler. . . But 
they will never attack his...  
L: His physical appearance? 
I: His physical appearance. 
 
To get a better sense of how female politicians are publicly represented in Guatemala, I perused 
user comments on social and other online media platforms. Many commenters repeatedly referred 
to presidential candidate Sandra Torres as “ugly” and a “witch,” while they called Alejandro 
Giammattei, as Isabel noted, a liar. As I previously discussed, the term “witch” is highly gendered 
and is typically used in reference to a woman who “lacks a moral compass,” particularly in the 
Judeo-Christian faiths. The term itself suggests that Torres lacks the moral character to run for—
much less, hold—political office. Questioning the morality of women in politics also came up in 
my conversation with Marta from CODEFEM, who shared an example of her former colleague: 
“One of our companions here, we motivated her to be a candidate for mayor of her town. A very 
intelligent woman. On her social networks, they [commenters] posted that . . . she was going to 
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the capital to whore around.” The comments directed towards Marta’s former co-worker once 
again recall the concept of marianismo (Stevens, 1973), as commenters deemed she went to the 
capital to “whore around.” These social media comments draw connections to the virgin-whore 
dichotomy because they suggest that a woman who “oversteps her boundaries” by taking on a 
position in the public sphere is a “whore.” On the other extreme, a woman confined to the so-called 
“private” sphere, who stays at home and cares for her family, is exemplary and righteous. Yet, as 
I have discussed, women within the “private” sphere can also be labelled whores if they transgress 
their social roles as dutiful mothers and wives, by, for instance, questioning the authority of a 
patriarchal figure. 
Isabel and Marta, however, also spoke about the structural barriers that women looking to 
run for political office face. Isabel noted that running for office requires time and money, and 
Marta compared political parties in Guatemala to businesses; she heard it can cost millions to be 
accepted into a political party. Freidenberg (2019) observes that Honduran women face similar 
party and socio-economic barriers, due to “circles of male power that foster old practices, making 
it difficult to select female candidates” and the “lack of resources for female candidates’ campaigns 
(cash ceilings), since women have less access to resources (money, political capital, mobilization 
capacity) than men.” (p. 4) Discussions on structural barriers to women in politics also came up in 
my interview with Teresa, an administrator from CEFEMINA in Costa Rica. Teresa claims that 
poverty weakens processes of political mobilization: “I always say that one of the things that 
demobilizes the most is precisely… Well, not in general terms, let’s say, but I believe that 
impoverishment demobilizes a lot, right? Because people are more and more concerned about rice 
and beans and less about generating collective actions.” Teresa’s claim highlights how structural 
conditions impede working class women from freely participating in political processes, whether 
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they choose to run for office or mobilize around political issues. 
Structural implications of political violence also became relevant in my phone interview 
with Adriana, an administrator from Movimiento Salvadoreño de Mujeres. Adriana discussed the 
structural impact of political violence on the lives of women in El Salvador in the form of wrongful 
termination of women’s employment:  
A: There is political violence, of course. Women have been kicked out of their jobs in a 
way, well, not in the right way. Their rights have been violated. There is political violence, 
but it is no longer the same violence that we lived thirty years ago. Now there is a social 
violence that seriously affects the country’s situation. 
L: So when we speak of political violence and how it affects women, you have mainly seen 
this in the positions of women who lost their jobs as a result of social violence, like gangs, 
and things like that? 
A: Yes, there is above all [inaudible] political violence. Not to political struggle. 
 
Adriana highlights how the state exacerbates women’s exposure to structural violence by 
disrupting their economic livelihoods. This may include, as she points out, the wrongful 
termination of women in positions of employment, which often stem from the belief that women 
are unfit to work in the public sphere (thus recalling symbolic violence). Adriana’s point also 
prompted me to think about women who are not ousted directly, but rather, lose their economic 
livelihoods as a result of neoliberal multicriminalism. (Speed, 2016) For instance, women who 
work as street vendors or manage their own small businesses often face extortion from gangs. 
These cycles of extortion are further aggravated by the state’s militarization of everyday life to 
fight gangs, making it unsafe for women to run their businesses out on the street due to the daily 
presence of this violence.  
 Highlighting the intersection of structural, symbolic, and gender violence with political 
violence is worth discussing in the context of policy implementation because representations of 
women in the political sphere matter. If women are poorly represented and mistreated in politics, 
policymakers are unlikely to create laws that genuinely work for women’s best interests. In these 
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cases, political violence can help breed legal violence (Menjívar and Abrego, 2012; Walsh and 
Menjívar, 2016b), as laws are constructed to subliminally (or openly) work against women’s 
rights. Additionally, repeatedly calling women in political positions of power “whores” and 
“witches” ingrains this vocabulary into the everyday speech of people, essentially making it 
acceptable to call women who do not conform to normative gender expectations these terms.  
 I do not wish, however, to suggest that increasing the number of women in political 
positions of power alone will combat political and legal violence. Several of my informants in 
Guatemala, for instance, made it clear that there are women in office with conservative views that 
would vote against resolutions that women’s organizations rally for. Additionally, some of my 
interviewees mentioned that because women continue to be underrepresented in the political realm, 
those who already hold office are likely subjected to pressure from their male counterparts. While 
I am cognizant of gender hierarchies and dynamics within political and legal frameworks in 
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, these discussions are beyond the scope of this work.   
Gender and Gendered Violence 
 Just as the terms political and state violence are sometimes used interchangeably, so are 
gender and gendered violence. Menjívar (2008), Menjívar and Walsh (2017), and Walsh and 
Menjívar (2016a), however, draw from Hammar’s (1999) work to highlight conceptual distinctions 
between the two. Menjívar (2008) emphasizes that Hammar’s (1999) conceptualization of gender 
violence refers to “the gender differences in a gender-imbalanced political economy that 
disadvantage women,” while gendered violence constitutes “acts of violence, including physical, 
psychological, and linguistic.” (p. 126; p. 91) Thus, per Hammar’s (1999) conceptualization, it 
would seem that gender violence is rooted in structural forms of violence, while direct and 
symbolic violence lay at the core of gendered violence. On the other hand, per Merry’s (2009) 
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conceptualization, gender violence is rooted in symbolic violence and aggravated by structural and 
direct violence, as it is “embedded in enduring patterns of kinship and marriage, but it can be 
exacerbated by very contemporary political and economic tensions.” (p. 2) Merry also claims that 
racism and inequality, conquest, occupation, colonialism, warfare and civil conflict, economic 
disruptions and poverty breed conditions that feed cycles of gender violence globally. Due to these 
intersecting conditions that induce structural forms of violence, Merry (2009) observes “it is not 
possible to develop any simple model that adequately describes [the] diversity [of gender violence] 
or the way it changes over time. Instead, it is important to locate interpersonal violence within 
wider social patterns of power and inequality.” (p. 23) The continuity between interpersonal 
violence and “common crime” can be seen not only through acts of the state, but also through the 
effects of neoliberal global economic policies, which reduce state and community support for the 
poor. Urbanization, wage labor, mobility, and the economic and cultural effects of globalization, 
Merry (2009) notes, have consequently “weakened the kinship-based systems that long served to 
control violence within families.” (p. 2) All of these factors place women, especially those living 
in conditions of poverty, at risk of repeated victimization.  
 Thus, if, as Hammar posits, gender violence refers to the “the gender differences in a 
gender-imbalanced political economy that disadvantage women,” in the context of Guatemala, El 
Salvador, and Honduras, it helps explain the prominence of heteronormative gender hierarchies 
and ideologies in the public and private sphere. Gendered violence, in turn, comprises the tools 
used to entrench these hierarchies/ideologies into the socio-economic-political fabric and punish 
those who do not conform to them. Hammar (1999) and Menjívar’s (2008) conceptualization of 
gender and gendered violence recalls the justifications provided for crimes against women in 
political discourse. As previously mentioned, crimes against women in the so-called private sphere 
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are often justified as crimes of passion. I noted that the “passion” in question often refers to 
jealousy that arose from a breach in a communal sharing (CS) or authority ranking (AR) 
relationship, such as a suspected or confirmed infidelity.40 (see Fiske, 1991) Araque and Ospina 
Vélez (2008) argue that gender ideologies normalize expressions of violence and justify 
‘punishments’ for those who diverge from normative social and gender roles; in the context of 
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, it would seem that gender constructions set in place by the 
state in conjunction with the Catholic and Evangelical Church have normalized certain acts of 
violence as appropriate responses or punishments for those who fail to conform to normative 
gender roles. The justification of crimes against women using gender ideologies also establishes 
patterns of culpability that cast blame on the victim, a tactic also historically used to justify state 
violence in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. One of my informants, Adela from FLACSO-
Guatemala, commented on the gendered dimensions of culpability and its ties to the civil conflict:  
Being a post-war society, it is important to refer to the immediate history of the internal 
armed conflict and how the atrocities that the state committed—for its counterinsurgency 
policy after the invasion of the United States in 1954—created generations of people who, 
in some way, even justified this state violence, right? It was very frequent and it is very 
frequent in the case of violence against women. Let people say, well, you’re going to see 
what it was, right? If the state killed him, it was because he was involved in something . . . 
All this also makes you build uncritical personalities. And in the case of women, this is 
accentuated, right? Because there is a message that if you are abused, if you are harassed, 
it is your fault, because you were dressed this way, you were in the wrong bar at the wrong 
time, because you should be in your house and not on the street . . . So all this contributes, 
of course, to internalizing behaviors to avoid violence or this notion of guilt. 
 
Adela observes that notions of culpability have transitioned from the internal armed conflict to 
violence against women in the “post-war” era. During the civil conflict, she notes, the state 
commonly justified murder by blaming the the victim for suspicious activity, such as collaborating 
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40 An authority ranking relationship is generally hierarchical, indicating that there is/are 
subordinate(s) and superior(s). A communal sharing relationship may be described as one in which 
the involved parties feel that “your pain is my pain” or “your happiness is my happiness.” 
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with communist rebel forces. In the “post-war” context, crimes against women are also justified 
by placing the spotlight on the women themselves; some of the justifications include, as Adela 
stated, that the women were dressed seductively or provocatively, they were at a bar or club at the 
wrong time, or they should have just stayed at home instead of being out on the street. This then 
shapes the narrative that women who seek to enter the public sphere, through labor and/or leisure, 
expose themselves to great risk of violence, and should therefore stay at home for their own safety. 
In turn, women who go out into the public sector and are killed, raped, and/or harassed are blamed 
for ignoring the so-called warnings and “looking for trouble.” Honduran president Juan Orlando 
Hernández reinforces these narratives, as he repeatedly emphasizes the significance of women’s 
roles in the family and the private sphere in official discourse. For example, in a February 2019 
speech on the Spotlight Initiative, Hernández highlighted that “it is necessary to work on educating 
and supporting the mother of families so that she, in turn, can replicate at home through her 
children and also through her partner or husband.” Under these terms, a woman’s influence in the 
public sphere is limited to the values and morals that she rubs off on her husband and children. 
This evokes the sense that husbands and children are the only ones meant to engage with the public 
sphere and outside community, such as through schooling and/or labor.  
Gendered violence also manifests in the political realm, primarily with symbolic 
dimensions. Several of my interviewees argued that women in political positions are criticized by 
the public for their outfits, bodies, appearance, or families. Elena, from Asociación Ciudadana 
ACCEDER in Costa Rica, observes that criticisms of women in politics are directed at their 
families and their bodies:  
Attacks that women experience when they get into politics have to do, number one, with 
attacks on the family—not directly—but attacks on the family and attacks on the body. I 
think these are two strong aspects. When it comes to family, I think there is no turning 
point in the sense that women can bear it, but when they tell you something about your 
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sons, your daughters, your mother, it’s like… it neutralizes them, okay? Things that do not 
happen with men and that have to do precisely because men usually do not take on 
caretaking, right? And the other is about physical appearance. 
 
Elena notes how indirect attacks on women in the political sphere took hold in the case of 
Alejandra Mora Mora, a human rights activist, lawyer, and professor who served as Minister for 
the Status of Women and President of the National Institute of Women (INAMU) from 2014 to 
2018. Elena said the public criticized Mora Mora so harshly following the end of her term as 
minister, she chose to retreat from the public eye: “[Mora Mora] was not a woman like those that 
involved her body or others. But the attacks she received were such that we saw her disappear. 
And since she stopped being a minister until now, [she has] a totally low profile. And I say, how 
crazy! I mean, because, if you had such a high position, you should keep going up! Like most 
men!” Elena’s observation of how female politicians are criticized in Costa Rica illustrates how 
women’s bodies are commoditized with respect to normative gender expectations. Female 
politicians are also specifically targeted for the factors that irrevocably “mark” them as women in 
a male-dominated sphere. On the one hand, their work and accomplishments are trivialized as their 
bodies are objectified by the male gaze. (Frederickson and Roberts, 1997) On the other hand, 
normative gender expectations dictate that women are natural caretakers, and should therefore 
focus on rearing children rather than running for political office. Thus, as Freidenberg (2019) 
claims, women face “cultural and attitude barriers, due to the belief among citizens and party elite 
that women are less capable of being candidates, of winning an election and/or governing . . . and 
due to the presence of cultural values at odds with gender equality and nondiscrimination.” (p. 4) 
Legal Violence 
 Walsh and Menjívar (2016b) integrate the concept of legal violence into their discussion 
on legal tolls and persistent impunity for feminicide in Guatemala, noting how it affects the 
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implementation of policies on gender-based violence. Menjívar and Abrego (2012) originally 
conceptualized legal violence within the context of Central American migration to the United 
States, arguing that “Central American immigrants in tenuous legal statuses experience current 
immigration laws in qualitatively different and more negative ways than in the recent past . . . this 
change is rooted in the effects of an increasingly fragmented and arbitrary field of immigration 
law gradually intertwined with criminal law.” (p. 1381) Legal violence, they write, helps “theorize 
the place of the law in shaping everyday life more generally.” (2012, p. 1381)  
Legal violence takes on many forms in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, especially 
when it comes to policies that reify normative gender expectations and punish women for stepping 
outside of these bounds. When I asked about laws that potentially work against the better interests 
of women, my informants shared numerous observations with me. Adela, from FLACSO-
Guatemala, gave an example of a now defunct provision in the 1963 Guatemalan Civil Code that 
claimed men could oppose their wives going out to work if it interfered with childcare. Following 
a search of the 1963 Civil Code, I found the provision in question: Article 114, which originally 
stated, “The husband may object to the wife engaging in activities outside the home, provided that 
he supplies what is necessary to support himself and his opposition has sufficiently justified 
reasons. The judge will decide outright what is appropriate.” (República de Guatemala, 1963) This 
provision directly clashes with Article 16(1)(g) of CEDAW, which the Guatemalan government 
ratified in 1982: “States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and in particular shall ensure, 
on a basis of equality of men and women . . . the same personal rights as husband and wife, 
including the right to choose a family name, a profession and an occupation.” A Congressional 
decree repealed Article 114 in 1998, sixteen years after the Guatemalan state ratified CEDAW. 
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The fact that the article was repealed in the aftermath of the civil conflict further reflects how 
deeply entrenched heteronormative constructions of gender and the family unit were in the social 
fabric during this time. As previously mentioned, and as Sanford (2008) demonstrates, these 
legacies of direct and indirect state violence have translated almost directly into cycles of gender-
based violence today, namely when it comes to feminicide. Thus, while the article in question no 
longer holds legal value, it remains a symbolic and structural barrier for women in the “public” 
sphere, especially among the citizenry who lived through the conflict. To relate this back to the 
implementation of policies on gender-based violence, it is important to note that these attitudes, 
shaped by antiquated and obsolete laws and provisions, continue to be invoked in symbolic and 
structural ways against women and their families who seek the justice and reparations accorded to 
them under the law. 
 Policies in Guatemala also have loopholes that allow perpetrators of sexual violence to 
evade prosecution. This is most evident in the country’s first Penal Code of 1973: Article 200 of 
the original document declared that “in the crimes of [rape, sexual aggression, statutory rape, and 
kidnapping], the criminal liability of the active subject or the penalty, if applicable, will be 
extinguished by the legitimate marriage of the victim with the offender, provided that the victim 
is older than twelve years and, in any case, with the prior approval of the Public Ministry.” 
(República de Guatemala, 1973) The article in question required the victim to be older than twelve 
years old and called for approval from the Public Ministry, but at no point mentioned the victim’s 
free and full consent to marriage as a requirement.41 Consequently, Article 200 of the 1973 
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41 Police and court systems also frequently overlook women’s safety and best interests in their 
application of the law by encouraging women to reconcile with their perpetrators. Walsh and 
Menjívar (2016a) emphasize that women looking to prosecute their perpetrators in El Salvador 
and Honduras are often pushed into mediation, “a court-mediated attempt to reunite victims with 
their aggressors.” (p. 598) 
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Guatemalan Penal Code contradicts Article 16(1)(a) and 16(1)(b) in CEDAW, which establish the 
state’s requirement to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women (a) the same right to enter 
into marriage, and (b) the same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into marriage only with 
their free and full consent. (UN Women, 2019) The Guatemalan Constitutional Court eventually 
declared Article 200 unconstitutional in 2006—32 years after the original Penal Code. As seen 
with Article 114 from the 1963 Civil Code, this policy remained in full effect throughout the 
internal armed conflict; considering the mass-scale use of sexual violence and disappearances 
during this period, Article 200 likely reinforced systemic impunity for perpetrators of war crimes. 
 In El Salvador and Honduras, absolute bans on abortion have interfered with the rights 
accorded to women under CEDAW. During our interview, Adriana from Movimiento Salvadoreño 
de Mujeres noted that the Salvadoran government ratified CEDAW in 1981, but continues to 
implement harsh abortion laws that actively work against a woman’s right to reproductive choice 
as laid out in the international convention. Article 16(1)(e) accords women and men “the same 
rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children and to have 
access to the information, education and means to enable them to exercise these rights.”42 Thus, 
despite the ratification of international conventions such as CEDAW and the Convention of Belém 
do Pará, all forms of abortion continue to be criminalized and heavily persecuted in El Salvador. 
A similar dynamic may be observed in Honduras, where the government has instituted an absolute 
ban on abortion despite having ratified CEDAW in 1983. The Salvadoran and Honduran state’s 
stance on women’s sexual and reproductive rights recalls legal violence because more often than 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 I checked if El Salvador or Honduras entered a reservation for Article 16 and found that neither 
did. In fact, the Convention “Committee remains convinced that reservations to article 16, whether 
lodged for national, traditional, religious or cultural reasons, are incompatible with the Convention 
and therefore impermissible and should be reviewed and modified or withdrawn.” (UN Women, 
2020) 
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not, laws on abortion are invoked before laws that address violence against women. This can, first 
and foremost, be observed in the priority that the Salvadoran and Honduran governments have 
given to the enforcement and implementation of anti-abortion laws over international protocols 
such as CEDAW. Anti-abortion laws are so heavily imposed that women who experience 
miscarriages are often accused of murdering their unborn child and are subsequently imprisoned 
when they seek medical help. (Viterna, 2012) This rhetoric has also made its way into political 
discourse in Guatemala, where abortion is only legal in cases of rape, incest, or when the mother’s 
life is in danger. As previously mentioned, in November 2016, former Guatemalan President 
Jimmy Morales openly denounced abortion: “As you know, I am not in favor of abortion. I will 
always be in favor of life, family, and marriage.” (Morales, 2016 Nov. 12) In his speech, Morales 
not only condemns abortion, but also follows this statement by upholding what he deems are the 
fundamental units of society: life, family, and marriage. He implies that women who undergo 
abortions pose a real threat to these national values. In El Salvador, 30-year-old Maria Edis’ 
miscarriage led to a 30-year prison sentence, which, Viterna (2012) observes, prosecutors justified 
with the notion that Maria “did not ‘act like a biological mother’ who would have taken actions to 
save her unborn child.” (p. 249) Connections to motherhood, therefore, seemingly assign value to 
women in society. National laws overtly reflect these values, as well. The Guatemalan Law for the 
Dignification and Integral Promotion of Women, for instance, claims that “in order to provide a 
stable environment that favors the eradication of discrimination and violence against women, the 
State will promote the revalorization of marriage and motherhood.” (República de Guatemala, 
1999; emphasis added) If we look at Steven’s (1973) concept of marianismo once more, women 
who fail to embody a virgin-like virtue as obedient mothers and wives, are, in turn, vile “whores” 
who deserve the utmost punishment for their cruel and evil practices. In turn, these women are 
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deemed unworthy of justice and support from the state, regardless of whether or not their 
pregnancy resulted from sexual violence or their miscarriage from structural inequalities.  
 Situating legal violence within a multisided violence framework helps unpack, as Menjívar 
and Abrego (2012) argue, the place of the law in shaping everyday life. In the case of Guatemala, 
El Salvador, and Honduras, it appears that legal violence feeds into several other forms, such as 
everyday, structural, symbolic, and direct violence. Because the language and purpose of laws 
helps shape attitudes on gender roles and expectations, legal violence shares certain overlaps with 
symbolic violence. The ways in which laws are constructed to benefit and privilege certain sectors 
of the population over others, such as upper-class, mestizo or European-descended men, draw ties 
to legal and structural violence. In turn, these symbolic and structural conditions become 
normalized through the application and implementation of laws that either directly or indirectly 
work against promoting women’s rights, thus yielding everyday violence. Lastly, laws that 
criminalize abortion exert direct violence on women’s bodies, as women in El Salvador and 
Honduras are required by law to endure painful, life-threatening pregnancies.  
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
Understanding the micro- and macro-processes of gender-based violence in Central 
America is a monumental task that requires synthesizing historical, political, social, economic, 
cultural, and legal sources. As time and space allowed, this work aimed to set up a panoramic look 
into the factors that affect policy implementation and enforcement on the ground in Guatemala, El 
Salvador, and Honduras. Following a survey of the extant literature, I found that most scholars 
discuss high rates of gender-based violence in these countries in the context of impunity. With this 
literature as a point of departure, Galtung’s violence triangle and Menjívar’s multisided violence 
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theoretical frameworks then helped me make better sense of how violence is shaped and 
understood in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, and, in turn, the effects that visible and 
invisible forms of violence have on gender-based violence.  
In this work, I revisit and situate the qualitative data I gathered through eight in-depth, 
semi-structured interviews and discourse analysis into these frameworks to understand how policy 
implementation is affected and processes of impunity are propelled by structural, cultural, 
symbolic, direct, state, everyday, political, gender, gendered, and legal violence. I found that 
structural and symbolic violence often work hand in hand in the micro-processes of gender-based 
violence: normative gender expectations reinforced by religion and the state, for instance, form 
barriers to women seeking access to systems of justice and help justify the nature of crimes against 
women. I discovered links between direct, state, and everyday violence, noting that the daily use 
of violence during internal armed conflicts in Guatemala and El Salvador, and post-coup d’état in 
Honduras, contributed to the normalization of the use of violence as a legitimate and appropriate 
response in the micro-processes of life. Drawing from my interviewees’ insights, I also learned 
about the deep ties between political, gender and gendered violence, more specifically how women 
in politics continue to be attacked in gendered ways with verbal and written assaults on their 
bodies. Because gender-based violence laws are the very core of this project, I unearth how the 
law itself—more specifically, the language and framing of legislation—interferes with 
implementation and enforcement processes. All these forms of violence, tied together with 
intersections of race, class, gender, age, language, religion, ethnicity, nationality, disability status, 
sexuality, and gender identity, ultimately form part of a much greater ensemble that constitute—
or at the very least, help inform—gender-based violence and violence against women. As 
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previously mentioned, Speed (2014) so aptly conceptualizes this nexus of socio-economic-
political factors as a “dreadful mosaic.” 
Future Directions 
 Surveying academic literature on gender-based violence inspired me to frame my research 
question around policy implementation and multisided violence. However, due to time constraints 
in the field, my research question addresses policy implementation on a broader geographic basis, 
drawing little distinction between urban and rural areas. With that said, there is a gap in the 
literature on processes of policy implementation in urban and rural areas of all three countries, but 
even more so in El Salvador and Honduras. Beck (2017) addresses this gap in Guatemala; her 
longitudinal ethnographic research on micro-lending NGOs in Guatemala problematizes how these 
organizations operationalize development interventions in rural and semi-rural communities. 
Guiding questions for research in rural El Salvador and Honduras include: does structural, cultural, 
symbolic, direct, state, political, gender, gendered, and legal violence affect policy implementation 
differently in urban and rural areas? If so, how? For a more focused implementation case study: 
how are laws perceived, interpreted, and implemented in a specific rural community in Guatemala, 
El Salvador, or Honduras?  
 Another possible direction for this study is a focus on Costa Rica, which has been even 
more understudied than El Salvador and Honduras in contexts of gender-based violence and 
violence against women. I did not focus on Costa Rica in this project due, in part, to its significantly 
lower rates of reported female homicides than in other Central American countries, but also 
because it has a markedly distinct socio-political-economic history. Yet, the fact that reported cases 
of feminicide, sexual violence, and intrafamily violence are significantly lower in Costa Rica 
should not indicate that gender and gendered violence are nonexistent there. Elena, from 
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Asociación Ciudadana ACCEDER, pointed this out during our interview: “Costa Rica is assumed 
to be fine. That there is no issue of violence and, of course, many times I also understand when we 
compare it with a situation like El Salvador or Nicaragua or Honduras, of course we are fine. But 
we are not fine. It is just that we are not as abysmal as the other countries are.” Studies on gender-
based violence and the implementation of policies in Costa Rica would, therefore, generate 
important contributions to the literature on these topics.  
One other future direction for this project includes a focus on violence against lesbian, 
bisexual, and transgender women in each of the Central American countries. More specifically, 
this research could explore questions such as: are lesbian, bisexual, and transgender women 
explicitly and/or implicitly protected under gender-based violence laws? Are gender-based 
violence laws applied differently to lesbian, bisexual, and transgender women than they are to 
heterosexual and cisgender women? If so, how? 
Women’s Agency and Vulnerability 
 In line with my feminist, decolonial epistemology, my primary responsibility in this 
research lay with the women who took the time to share their expertise on issues of gender-based 
violence in Central America with me. (Chang et al., 2017, p. 194; Madison, 2005, p. 111) This 
research, therefore, aims to speak truth to the work of human rights and women’s organizations to 
ensure that women define their own experiences with human rights, instead of researchers 
interpreting them for and about them. (Gervais, 2010, p. 23) I tried to secure this, in part, by 
learning from my participants’ firsthand experience to inform my own understandings of violence. 
Through their work (rather than through scholarship), these women inductively reason that 
violence is multisided and develop sophisticated theoretical frameworks with which to understand 
gender-based violence.  
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These organizations continue to find new ways to support women’s rights and liberation. 
Grupo Guatemalteco de Mujeres, for instance, developed a Comprehensive Support Center for 
Female Survivors of Violence (CAIMUS), where women facing violence can find support, 
information, and advice. CODEFEM created a Local Women’s Commission for Disaster 
Reduction (COLMRED), Movimiento Salvadoreño de Mujeres established a Comprehensive 
Education in Sexuality (EIS) Coalition to promote women’s education on sexual and reproductive 
rights, and Asociación Ciudadana ACCEDER in Costa Rica pushed for a legislative bill to sanction 
street harassment. Women are also voicing their concerns through creative media; in Guatemala, 
Regina José Galindo and Mandy Joha have held powerful performance art demonstrations that 
visualize the severity of violence against women. I personally observed voice and agency 
manifested in urban and street art in San José, Costa Rica (see Appendices). Drawing from Bunch 
(2004), Gervais (2010) emphasizes that these manifestations are powered by “the voice and agency 
of citizens who are not just passive objects with needs.” (p. 31; p. 23) 
In light of the numerous forms of violence they face everyday, the trope of the “vulnerable 
woman” remains a key component of the heteropatriarchal state in Guatemala, El Salvador, and 
Honduras. During our interview, Marta from CODEFEM claimed: “Women are not vulnerable. 
We are made vulnerable. The system makes women vulnerable.” In this sense, vulnerability is not 
an inherent trait. Rather, it is imposed on women in multiple, intersecting ways by local, national, 
and global systems of inequality. (Speed, 2019, p. 3) As women continue to speak out, inform 
themselves, and form solidarity networks, they elucidate how structural, symbolic, direct, state, 
political, gender, gendered, and legal forms of violence aim to discredit them. Despite the 
challenges they face in their day-to-day lives, these resilient actors continue to strive toward a life 
free of all forms of violence.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Table 1. Reported Cases of Intrafamily Violence in Guatemala, 2008-2017 
 
Year Reported Cases of 
Intrafamily Violence 
2008 23,721 
2009 31,497 
2010 32,017 
2011 33,484 
2012 36,107 
2013 36,170 
2014 34,330 
2015 31,929 
2016 31,190 
2017 30,384 
 
Source: Policía Nacional Civil; UNDP; Infosegura/MINGOB 
 
 
 
Table 2. Deaths of Women Registered as Homicides in Honduras, 2005-2018 
 
Year Homicides 
2005 175 
2006 202 
2007 295 
2008 313 
2009 363 
2010 385 
2011 512 
2012 606 
2013 636 
2014 526 
2015 478 
2016 468 
2017 388 
2018 383 
 
Source: Policía Preventiva/Observatorio de la Violencia, UNAH 
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Table 3. Reported Cases of Sexual Violence Against Women in Honduras, 2005-2018 
 
Year Reported Cases of 
Sexual Violence 
2005 1,052 
2006 1,111 
2007 988 
2008 1,241 
2009 1,937 
2010 2,690 
2011 2,811 
2012 2,648 
2013 2,561 
2014 2,195 
2015 2,619 
2016 2,722 
2017 2,761 
2018 2,598 
 
Source:!Policía Preventiva/Observatorio de la Violencia, UNAH 
 
 
Table 4. Reported Cases of Intrafamily Violence in El Salvador, 2005-2018 
 
Year Reported Cases of Intrafamily Violence 
2005 3,478 
2006 3,586 
2007 4,443 
2008 4,789 
2009 5,208 
2010 1,697 
2011 1,964 
2012 1,719 
2013 3,052 
2014 2,873 
2015 1,100 
2016 1,583 
2017 1,519 
2018 1,426 
 
Source: Policía Nacional Civil; Procuradoría para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (PDDH); 
Instituto Salvadoreño para el Desarrollo de la Mujer (ISDEMU) 
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                 “No + Femicidios!”                        “Ni Una Menos!”  
             San José, Costa Rica           San José, Costa Rica 
 
 
     
      “Contra la violencia patriarcal                “No + Niñas Violadas!!”  
nuestra alegre rebeldía”         San José, Costa Rica 
             San José, Costa Rica 
 
 
 
         “Machismo de derecha =      Poster Ad Denouncing Sexual Violence  
            Machismo izquierda”         Against Children and Adolescents 
  University of Costa Rica, San José             Guatemala City, Guatemala 
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